The 19th Stony Brook Game Theory Festival
of the Game Theory Society

Workshop on Recent Advances in Repeated Games
July 20-22, 2008

<u>**Sunday, July 20**</u>

Morning Sessions:

08:30-09:00   Breakfast

09:00-10:30   Martin Cripps, University College London
                     The Value of a Reputation under Imperfect Monitoring

                     Qingmin Liu, University of Pennsylvania
                     Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics

11:00-12:30   Ilya Khayutin, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
                     Communication with Unobservable constraints

                     Alon Shapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
                     Symmetric Online Matching Pennies

12:30-14:30   Lunch Break

Afternoon Sessions:

14:30-16:00   Eilon Solan, Tel Aviv University
                     Sequential Decision Problems with Imperfect Monitoring

                     Tadashi Sekiguchi, Kyoto University
                     Repeated Games with Costly Imperfect Monitoring

16:30-18:00   Abraham Neyman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
                     TBA
                     John Nash, Princeton University
                     TBA

18:30-21:00   Reception Dinner at Curry Club

Monday, July 21

Morning Sessions:

08:30-09:00   Breakfast

09:00-10:30   George Mailath, University of Pennsylvania
                 Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring

                 Stefano Lovo, HEC Paris
                 Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information:
                 The N- Player Case

11:00-12:30   Tristan Tomala, HEC Paris
                 Protocols for Fault Identification in Partially Known Networks

                 Sergiu Hart, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
                 On the Optimality of Regret Matching in Repeated Games

12:30-14:30   Lunch Break

Afternoon Sessions:

14:30-16:00   David Miller, University of California, San Diego
                 A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games with Renegotiation

                 Axel Anderson, Georgetown University
                 The Durable Information Monopolist

16:30-18:00   Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University
                 Repeated Games with Frequent Signals

                 V Bhaskar, University College London
                 Purification and Finite Memory in Repeated Games

19:00–21:00   Reception Dinner at Three Village Inn

Morning Sessions:

08:30-09:00   Breakfast

09:00-10:30   Larry Samuelson, Yale University
                   Common Learning

                   Thomas Wiseman, University of Texas at Austin
                   A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning

11:00-12:30   Nicolas Vieille, HEC Paris
                   Strategic Information Exchange in Repeated Games

                   Mehmet Ekmekci, Northwestern University
                   Reputation with Long Run Players

12:30-14:30   Lunch Break

Afternoon Sessions:

14:30-16:00   Jerôme Renault, University Paris Dauphine
                   Existence of the Value in Repeated Games with an Informed Controller

                   Satoru Takahashi, Princeton University
                   Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play

16:30-17:15   Julio Gonzalez-Diaz, Northwestern University
                   Community Enforcement Beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma