Intensive Course on Repeated GamesOrganized by Robert J. Aumann, Jean-François Mertens, and Abraham NeymanJuly 12 to July 16, 1993
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Monday, July 12, to Friday, July 16: Earth and Space Sciences
001 Each day there will be four one-hour lectures: at 10:00, 11:30, 2:30, and 4:00. | |
Part A: Games with Complete Information | |
A.1 | general model of repeated games, definition of Ginfinity, Gn, Glambda, or generally Gtheta |
A.2 | max min and min max and individually rational payoffs of the repeated game |
A.3 | equilibria in Gn, Glambda, Ginfinity |
A.4 | subgame perfect equilibria in Gn, Glambda, Ginfinity |
A.5 | Blackwell's approachability theorems
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Part B: Stochastic Games | |
B.1 | general motivations and model |
B.2 | basic results in the discounted and undiscounted
cases:
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B.3 | study of the Big Match |
B.4 | existence of nuinfinity |
B.5 | existence of equilibria
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Part C: Games with Incomplete Information | |
C.1 | general motivation and model |
C.2 | lack of information on one side: infinite stage game and limit of finitely many stages |
C.3 | lack of information on both sides: min max and max min |
C.4 | equilibria: characterization and bimartingales, existence theorem |