INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORYJuly 15 to July 18, 1991Stony Brook, New YorkPROGRAM | |
| MONDAY, JULY 15
| |
| Harriman Hall, Room 137 Chair: Beth Allen | |
| 9:30-10:45 | T. Bewley: Knightian Decision Theory |
| 11:00-12:15 |
R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger:
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
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| Learning and Bayesian Models -- Harriman Hall, Room 137 Chair: Sylvain Sorin | |
| 2:30-3:00 | M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob: Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games |
| 3:00-3:30 | N. Shimkin: Asymptotically Efficient Strategies in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information |
| 3:30-4:00 | B. Sloth, E. Hendon, H.J. Jacobson, and M.T. Nielsen: A Learning Process for Games |
| 4:30-5:00 | H. Haller, J. Eichberger, and F. Milne: Naive Bayesian Learning in 2 x 2 Matrix Games |
| 5:00-5:30 | D. Monderer and D. Samet: Stochastic Common Learning |
| 5:30-6:00 | R. Rosenthal:
Rules of Thumb in Games
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| Shapley Value and Fair Division -- Harriman Hall, Room 104 Chair: Stef Tijs | |
| 2:30-3:00 | T.E.S Raghavan and C. Hsiao: Shapley Value for Multi-Choice Cooperative Games (I) |
| 3:00-3:30 | A. Nowak and T. Radzik: Weighted Values for n-Person Games |
| 3:30-4:00 | I. Dragan: An Alternative Algebraic Definition of the Weighted Shapley Value |
| 4:30-5:00 | Y. Chun: On the Symmetric and Weighted Shapley Value |
| 5:00-5:30 | W. Thomson: Manipulation and Implementation of Solutions to Fair Division |
| 5:30-6:00 | J. Legut, J. Potters, and S. Tijs:
Economies with Land: The NTU-Case
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| 6:15-6:45 | Harriman Hall, Room 137
Special Lecture Professor Sun Juan Director, Research Center Beijing Institute of Management Chinese Academy of Sciences "Reforming the Chinese Economy: Two Major Problems" |
| TUESDAY, JULY 16 | |
| Harriman Hall, Room 137 Chair: Marilda Sotomayor | |
| 9:30-10:45 | E. Kohlberg: Rationale for Perfect Equilibrium |
| 11:00-12:15 |
S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell:
N-Person Non-Cooperative Bargaining
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| Refinement of Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 137 Chair: John Hillas | |
| 2:30-3:00 | J. Swinkels: Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants |
| 3:00-3:30 | S. Elmes: Equally Informative Games: A Definition and Characterization |
| 3:30-4:00 | B. Chakravorti and C. Kahn:
Universal Coalition-Proof Equilibrium
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| Issues in Cooperative Games-- Harriman Hall, Room 104 Chair: Olga Bondareva | |
| 2:30-3:00 | M. Chwe: A Far-Sighted Approach to Coalitional Stability |
| 3:00-3:30 | E. Einy and B. Peleg: Linear Measures of Inequality for Cooperative Games |
| 3:30-4:00 | C. Chang and F.C. Hsiag:
An Example on Quasi-Zero-Monotonic Games
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| Repeated Games and Bounded Rationality -- Harriman Hall, Room 137 Chair: Abraham Neyman | |
| 4:30-5:00 | J. Gata: A Note on Decision-Making Complexity in the Context of the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
| 5:00-5:30 | S. Chakrabarti: Finite Complexity, Bounded Recall and the Folk Theorem in Repeated Games |
| 5:30-6:00 | F. Thuijsman:
Repeated Games with Restricted Memory Size
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| The Nucleolus -- Harriman Hall, Room 104 Chair: Michael Maschler | |
| 4:30-5:00 | T.S.H. Driessen: Coincidenc of and Collinearity Between Game Theoretic Solutions |
| 5:00-5:30 | P. Sudholter and J. Rosenmüller: The Nucleolus of Homogeneous Games with Steps |
| 5:30-6:00 | Y. Yanovskaya:
The Excess Functions and Nucleoli in Cooperative Games
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| Issues in Noncooperative Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 108 Chair: Thomas Muench | |
| 4:30-5:00 | J. Abdou: Solvability of Game Forms, Some Results in the Infinite Case |
| 5:00-5:30 | M. Sobel: Discounting and Risk Neutrality |
| 5:30-6:00 | E. Feinberg and A. Schwartz:
Markov Decision Models with Weighted Discounted Criteria
|
| WEDNESDAY, JULY 17 | |
| Harriman Hall, Room 137 Chair: Robert Aumann | |
| 9:30-10:45 | B. Peleg and A. Shmida: Short-Run Stable Matching Between Bees and Flowers |
| 11:00-12:15 |
M. Sotomayor:
Stability Versus Pairwise Stability in the Two-Sided
Many-to-Many Matching
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| Issues in Cooperative Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 137 Chair: Irinel Dragan | |
| 2:30-3:00 | S.H. Tijs, I.J. Curiel, J.A.M. Potters, V.R. Prasad, and B. Veltman: Sequencing and Cooperation |
| 3:00-3:30 | T. Quint: Lattices and Two-Sided Matching Markets |
| 4:00-4:30 | J. Zhao: The Hybrid Solutions of an N-Person Game |
| 4:30-5:00 | Y. Zhou: Strategy Domination and the Related Cores |
| 5:00-5:30 | L. Zhou:
An 'Average' Lyapunov-Type Convexity Result and Some Core Equivalence Results
|
| Evolutionary Stable Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 104 Chair: Elon Kohlberg | |
| 2:30-3:00 | S. Scotchmer and E. Dekel: On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior |
| 3:00-3:30 | J. Swinkels: On the Stability of
Evolutionary Stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg-Mertens
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| Repeated Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 104 Chair: Joseph Abdou | |
| 3:30-4:00 | B. De Meyer:
Repeated Games and the Central Limit Theorem
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| Knowledge and Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 104 Chair: Dov Monderer | |
| 4:30-5:00 | G. Bonanno: Knowledge and Beliefs in Extensive Games |
| 5:00-5:30 | R. Nau: The Incoherence of Agreeing to
Disagree
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| Imperfect Competition -- Harriman Hall, Room 108 Chair: Israel Zang | |
| 3:30-4:00 | A. Urbano: Duopoly Experimentation: Cournot and Bertrand Competition |
| 4:30-5:00 | S.J. Turnbull: Organizations as Teams of Automata |
| 5:00-5:30 | H. Peters, H. van der Stel, and T. Storcken:
Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and Strategy-Proofness in Location Problems
|
| Harriman Hall, Room 137 | |
| 5:30-7:00 | Special Session: Research Ideas by Students |
| THURSDAY, JULY 18 | |
| Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Walter Trockel | |
| 9:30-10:45 | B. Allen: Market Games with Asymmetric
Information and Non-Transferable Utility: Representation Results and the Core
|
| Industrial Organization I -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Reiko Aoki | |
| 11:00-11:30 | S. Lippman and J. Mamer: Innovation with a Large First-Mover Advantage |
| 11:30-12:00 | W. Leininger: Patent Competition and
Rent Dissipation: Do Incumbents Move First?
|
| Fair Assignments and Exchange Economies -- Harriman Hall, Room 104 Chair: Olga Bondareva | |
| 11:00-11:30 | L. Zhou: Strictly Fair Allocations in Large Exchange Economies |
| 11:30-12:00 | A. Alkan: Monotonicity and Fair
Assignments
|
| Bargaining -- Harriman Hall, Room 108
Chair: William Thomson | |
| 11:00-11:30 | B. Bensaid and R. Gary-Bobo: An Exact Formula for the Lion's Share: A Model of Pre-Play Negotiation |
| 11:30-12:00 | O. Bondareva and T. Kulakovskaia:
Extensive Coverings and Core-Stability in Cooperative Games
|
| Strategic Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 137 Chair: Bezalel Peleg | |
| 2:00-2:30 | M. Maschler, J.L. Ferreira, and Y. Gilboa: How to Play a Game When Utilities Change in Times |
| 2:30-3:00 | B. Shitovitz: On the Optimistic Stable Standards of Behavior for a Class of Continuous Game Trees with Finite Outdegree |
| 3:00-3:30 | P. Coughlin: Pure Strategy Equilibria in a Class of Systems Defense Games |
| 4:00-4:30 | O. Bondareva: The Simplest Dynamic Game-Theoretical Model of an Economy |
| 4:30-5:00 | J. Zhao and M. Shubik: A Stategic Market Game of a Finite Exchange Economy with a Mutual Bank |
| 5:00-5:30 | L. Kranich:
Equity, Efficiency and Incentives
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| Repeated Games and Incomplete Information -- Harriman Hall, Room 104 Chair: Frank Thuijsman | |
| 2:00-2:30 | A. Dasgupta: Sub-Game Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Nonstationary Discounting |
| 2:30-3:00 | A. Blume: Intra-Play Communication in Repeated Games |
| 3:00-3:30 | J. Sachs and J.P. Langlois: An Integrative Approach to Subgame Perfect Reaction Function Equilibria in Discounted Supergames |
| 4:00-4:30 | J. Bergin and D. Bernhardt: Anonymous Sequential Games with General State Space |
| 4:30-5:00 | R. Serrano and O. Yosha: Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: The One-Sided Information Case |
| 5:00-5:30 | A. Heifetz:
Hierarchic Constructions of Incomplete-Information Models
|
| Industrial Organization II -- Harriman Hall, Room 108 Chair: Suzanne Scotchmer | |
| 2:00-2:30 | I. Zang and M. Kamien: Merger by Repeated Acquisition |
| 2:30-3:00 | D. Salant and N. Gandal: Movie Wars: Competitition Between Telephone and CATV Companies for Programming |
| 3:00-3:30 | S. Govindan: Stability and the Chain-Store Paradox |
| 4:00-4:30 | N. Gandal, A. Fishman, and O. Shay:
Planned Obsolescence as an Engine of Technological Progress
|
| Issues in Cooperative Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 108 Chair: Ahmet Alkan | |
| 4:30-5:00 | A. van den Nouweland: Cores and Related Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games |
| 5:00-5:30 | G. Engl and S. Scotchmer: The Core and the Hedonic Core: Equivalence and Comparative Statics |