Workshop on Game Theory and Computer Science

Organized by Robert Aumann and William Sharkey

Co-Sponsored by Bellcore

July 28 to July 29, 1993

Stony Brook, New York

PROGRAM



  WEDNESDAY, JULY 28

10:00-10:45 I.-K. Cho: On Complexity of Repeated Principal-Agent Game

11:00-11:45 T. Van Zandt: Information Processing and Returns to Scale in Statistical Decision Problems

2:00-2:45 A. Lewis: Clasees, Approximate Solutions to Arrow's Problem and the Low Basis Theorem

3:00-3:45 A. Rustichini: Unawareness

4:00-4:45 D. Holt: Coherent Belief Revision in Games: When Knowledge Confronts Impossibility


  THURSDAY, JULY 29

10:00-10:45 P. Young: An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining

11:00-11:45 G. Ellison: Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination

2:00-2:45 U. Schwalbe: Learning and Adaptation Processes in Games with Local Interaction Structures

3:00-3:45 G.J. Mailath: Perpetual Randomness in Evolutionary Economics

4:00-4:45 F. Vega-Redondo: Multilevel Evolution in Population Games