MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS

Organized by Philip Reny

July 16 to July 18, 2000


Official Program



SUNDAY, JULY 16

10:00 am - 11:00 am Efficient Mechanism Design
Vijay Krishna, Penn State University
(with M. Perry, Hebrew University)

11:15 am - 12:15 pm An Efficient Simultaneous Multi-Unit Auction
Philip Reny, University of Chicago
(with M. Perry, Hebrew University)

2:00 pm - 3:00 pm Properties of Large Auctions
Jeroen Swinkels, Washington University

3:15 pm - 4:15 pm Collusion in Repeated Auctions and Pricing Games
Susan Athey, MIT


MONDAY, JULY 17

10:00 am - 11:00 am Optimal Bidding in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions
S. Viswanathan, Duke University
(with J. Wang, Duke University, and T. Witelski, Duke University)

11:15 am - 12:15 pm Multi-Unit Demand Auctions with Synergies: Behavior in Sealed-Bid Versus Ascending-Bid Auctions
John Kagel, Ohio State University
(with Dan Levin, Ohio State University)

2:00 pm - 3:00 pm Correlated Signals Against Monotone Equilibria
Michael Landsberger, Haifa University
(with B. Tsirelson, Tel Aviv University)

3:15 pm - 4:15 pm Existence in Discontinuous Bayesian Games With Applications to Auctions
Jeroen Swinkels, Washington University
(with M. Jackson, CALTECH)


TUESDAY, JULY 18

10:00 am - 11:00 am An Efficient Ascending Multi-Unit Auction
Philip Reny, University of Chicago
(with M. Perry, Hebrew University)

11:15 am - 12:15 pm On Generalizing the English Auction
Larry Ausubel, University of Maryland

2:00 pm - 3:00 pm Asymmetric English Auctions
Vijay Krishna, Penn State University

3:15 pm - 4:15 pm The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities
Ennio Stachetti, University of Maryland
(with F. Gul, Princeton University)