International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 13-17, 2009

Schedule of Talks

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Monday, July 13

8:45 - 9:00

Breakfast

9:00 - 9:45

Yair Tauman  (SUNY Stony Brook and Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC))
The Decision to Attack a Nuclear Facility: The Role of Intelligence

9:45 - 10:30

Francis Bloch  (Universite catholique de Louvain)
Dynamic assignment of durable objects

10:30 - 11:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Solution Concepts
Chair: Charles Zheng

Session B: Fairness
Chair: Artus Philipp Rosenbusch

Session C: Market Games
Chair: Eiichiro Kazumori

Session D: Knowledge and Expectations
Chair: Ziv Hellman

 

11:15 - 11:35

Noah Stein  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Games on Manifolds  

Steven Brams  (New York University)
The Undercut Procedure: An Algorithm for the Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items  

Tanguy Isaac  (Université Catholique de Louvain)
Information Revelation in Markets with Pairwise Meetings : Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis  

 

 

11:40 - 12:00

José Manuel Zarzuelo  (Basque Country University)
The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel and the Core on NTU Games and Exchange Economies  

Ahuva Mu'alem  (California Institute of Technology)
On Multi-Dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms  

 

Itai Arieli  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Rationalizability in Continuous Games  

 

12:05 - 12:25

Charles Zheng  (Iowa State University)
A Noncooperative Reformulation of the Core  

Artus Philipp Rosenbusch  (Darmstadt University of Technology)
Satisfiable Fairness in Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (University of Tokyo)
Dynamic Limit Order Book Markets  

Ziv Hellman  (Hebrew University)
How Common are Common Priors?  

 

12:25 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Amparo Urbano  (University of Valencia)
Pragmatic Languages and Universal Grammars: An Equilibrium Approach

 

Session A: Industrial Organization
Chair: Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Session B: Bounded Rationality
Chair: Penelope Hernandez

Session C: Voting
Chair: Suntak Kim

Session D: Learning and Evolution
Chair: Javier Rivas

Session E: Matching
Chair: Brijesh Preston Pinto

14:50 - 15:10

Chun-Hui Miao  (University of South Carolina)
Sequential Innovation, Technology Leakage and the Duration of Technology Licensing  

Ying-Ju Chen  (University of California, Berkeley)
Contractual Traps  

Yaron Azrieli  (The Ohio State University)
Characterization of Multidimensional Spatial Models of Elections with a Valence Dimension  

Emerson Melo  (California Institute of Technology)
Congestion Pricing and Learning in Traffic Networks Games  

Emiliya Lazarova  (Queen's University Belfast)
Coalitional Matchings  

15:15 - 15:35

Evangelos Rouskas  (Athens University of Economics and Business)
Efficient Delay in Decision Making  

Russell Golman  (University of Michigan)
Quantal Response Equilibria with Heterogeneous Agents  

Sourav Bhattacharya  (University of Pittsburgh)
Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections  

Marius-Ionut Ochea  (University of Amsterdam)
Evolution in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under Perturbed Best-Reply Dynamics  

Ana Mauleon  (Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis)
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching  

15:40 - 16:00

Andriy Zapechelnyuk  (University of Bonn)
Bargaining Against a Status Quo: the Algebra of Strikes  

Penelope Hernandez  (University of Valencia)
Bounded Memory Equilibrium  

Suntak Kim  (University of Pittsburgh)
Divergence in Pre-Electoral Campaign Promises with Post-Electoral Policy Bargaining  

Javier Rivas  (University of Leicester)
Cooperation, Imitation and Correlated Matching  

Brijesh Preston Pinto  (University of Southern California)
Strongly Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences  

16:00 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Sergiu Hart  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Dynamics and Equilibrium

 

Tuesday, July 14

8:45 - 9:00

Breakfast

9:00 - 9:45

Olivier Gossner  (Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics)
A Reasoning Approach to Knowledge

9:45 - 10:30

Herve Moulin  (Rice University)
Pricing Traffic in a Spanning Network

10:30 - 11:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A:Auctions
Chair: Gagan Pratap Ghosh

Session B:Mechanism Design
Chair: Rodrigo Velez

Session C:Learning and Evolution
Chair: Fernando M. Louge

Session D:Matching
Chair: Marco Scarsini

 

11:15 - 11:35

Chia-Hui Chen  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Name Your Own Price at Priceline.com:  

Gwenael Piaser  (Université du Luxembourg)
Moral Hazard: Deterministic Indirect Mechanisms and Efficiency  

 

Nicolas (Alexandre) Klein  (University of Munich)
Free-Riding And Delegation In Research Teams  

 

11:40 - 12:00

Emel Filiz Ozbay  (University of Maryland)
Multi‐unit Auctions with Resale  

 

Reinoud Joosten  (University of Twente)
Generalized Projection Dynamics in Evolutionary Game Theory  

Antonio Miguel Osorio-Costa  (University Carlos III Madrid)
Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time  

 

12:05 - 12:25

Gagan Pratap Ghosh  (University of Iowa)
Efficiency in a Class of Multi-Unit Auctions  

Rodrigo Velez  (University of Rochester)
Are Incentives against Justice  

Fernando M. Louge  (University of Wisconsin - Madison)
Evolution with Private Information: Caution, Contrarianism and Herding  

Marco Scarsini  (Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali)
Repeated Congestion Games with Local Information  

 

12:25 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Wolfgang Pesendorfer  (Princeton University)
Measurable Ambiguity

 

Session A:Mechanism Design
Chair: Rida Laraki

Session B:Learning and Evolution
Chair: Hsiao-Chi Chen

Session C:Signaling
Chair: David Ong

Session D:Bargaining
Chair: Uri Weiss

Session E:Contracts
Chair: Bo Chen

14:50 - 15:10

Daniele Condorelli  (UCL and Northwestern University)
Value, Willingness to Pay and the Allocation of Scarce Resources  

Christopher Byrne  (Penn State University)
Size Dependence in an Evolutionary Game Model of Self-Deception  

Rabah Amir  (Université catholique de Louvain)
Network E¤ects, Market Structure and Industry Performance  

Toshiji Miyakawa  (Osaka University of Economics)
On the Bilateral Contracting Process in Economies with Externalities  

Helena Aten  (Georgetown University)
Competing Informed Principals and Representative Democracy  

15:15 - 15:35

Siddhartha Sahi  (Rutgers University)
The Allocation of a Prize  

Christina Achampong  (Penn State University)
The Effect of Belief on Performance and of Encounter History on Beliefs in Hawk-Dove Competitions  

Wooyoung Lim  (University of Pittsburgh)
Communication in Bargaining over Decision Rights  

Uri Weiss  (The Center for The Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University)
The Robber Asks to be Punished  

Kristina Buzard  (University of California, San Diego)
Contracting Problems and the Technology of Trade: A Robustness Result with Application to Hold-Up  

15:40 - 16:00

Rida Laraki  (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Ecole Polytechnique)
Majority Judgment Strategic Analysis  

Hsiao-Chi Chen  (National Taipei University)
Imitation, Local Interaction, and Coordination  

David Ong  (University of California)
Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and Guilt  

 

Bo Chen  (Southern Methodist University)
Optimal Time-Contingent Contract Design  

16:00 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Peyton Young  (University of Oxford)
Gaming Performance Fees by Portfolio Managers: An Application of Game Theory to Finance

18:00 - 22:00

Reception Dinner (Jasmine

 

Wednesday, July 15

8:45 - 9:00

Breakfast

9:00 - 9:45

Amy Greenwald  (Brown University)
An Algorithm to Compute the Stochastically Stable Distribution of a Perturbed Markov Matrix

9:45 - 10:30

Barry O'Neill  (University of California, Los Angeles)
Vagueness in Communication

10:30 - 11:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A:Solution Concepts
Chair: Elena Inarra

Session B:Mechanism Design
Chair: Victor Naroditskiy

Session C:Signaling
Chair: Younghwan In

Session D:Bargaining
Chair: Ching-jen Sun

Session E:Networks
Chair: Sunghoon Hong

11:15 - 11:35

Paulo Barelli  (University of Rochester)
On the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous and Qualitative Games  

 

 

Matthew Elliott  (Stanford University)
Inefficiencies in Trade Networks  

 

11:40 - 12:00

Grandjean Gilles  (university of Louvain (UCL))
Strongly Rational Sets for Normal Form Games  

Ruben Juarez  (University of Hawaii)
Monotonic Solutions to the Experts Aggregation Problem  

Wolf Gick  (Harvard University)
Like-Biased Experts And Noisy Signals  

Asha Sadanand  (University of Guelph)
Outside Options and Investment  

Miguel A Duran  (University of Malaga)
The Economics of Favoritism  

12:05 - 12:25

Elena Inarra  (University of the Basque Country)
Deriving Nash Equilibria as the Supercore for a Relational System  

Victor Naroditskiy  (Brown University)
Destroy to Save  

Younghwan In  (National University of Singapore)
Signaling Private Choices  

Ching-jen Sun  (Deakin University)
Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions  

Sunghoon Hong  (Vanderbilt University)
Enhancing Transportation Security against Terrorist Attacks  

12:25 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Kfir Eliaz  (Brown University)
Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects

 

Session A:Incomplete Information
Chair: Fristan Tomala

Session B:Bargaining
Chair: Daniel Quint

Session C:Networks
Chair: Vincent Vannetelbosch

Session D:Cooperative Games
Chair: Omer Edhan

Session E:Auctions
Chair: Cornelia F.A. Van Wesenbeeck

14:50 - 15:10

Scott Woodroofe Cunningham  (Delft University of Technology)
Strategic Transmission of Information and the Framing of Environmental Regulation  

Louis Boguchwal  (University of St Andrews)
A System for Modeling Strategy Change, Demonstrated with the Ultimatum Game  

Maximilian Mihm  (Cornell University)
What Goes Around Comes Around: A theory of strategic indirect reciprocity in networks  

Josune Albizuri  (Basque Country University)
Values and Coalition Configurations  

Itai Sher  (University of Minnesota)
Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism  

15:15 - 15:35

Yehuda Levy  (Hebrew University)
Stochastic Games with Information Lag  

Wioletta Dziuda  (Northwestern University)
Dynamic Policy-Making with Endogenous Default  

Roland Pongou  (Brown University)
A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS  

 

Yong Sui  (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)
All-pay Auctions with Private Values and Resale  

15:40 - 16:00

Tristan Tomala  (HEC Paris)
Existence of Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-own Payoffs  

Daniel Quint  (University of Wisconsin)
Bargaining with Endogenous Information  

Vincent Vannetelbosch  (CORE)
Connections among Farsighted Agents  

Omer Edhan  (The Hebrew University)
Continuous Values of Exact Market Games  

Cornelia F.A. Van Wesenbeeck  (VU University Amsterdam)
The Primal Auction: a New Design for Multi-commodity Double Auctions  

16:00 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Jeffrey Ely  (Northwestern University)
Sunk-cost Bias: A Memory Kludge

 

Thursday, July 16

8:45 - 9:00

Breakfast

9:00 - 9:45

Jacob Goeree  (California Institute of Technology)
Threshold versus Exposure in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions

9:45 - 10:30

Francoise Forges  (Universite Paris Dauphine)
Core-stable bidding rings

10:30 - 11:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A:Repeated Games
Chair: Takako Fujiwara-Greve

Session B:Networks
Chair: Dinko Dimitrov

Session C:Cooperative Games
Chair: Nichalin Suakkaphong

Session D:Experimental Economics
Chair: Ping Zhang

Session E:Miscellaneous
Chair: Attila Ambrus

11:15 - 11:35

Georgy Artemov  (University of Melbourne)
Finitely Repeated Bilateral Trade  

 

Mahmoud Farrokhi Kashani  (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
Coalition Formation in the Airport Problem  

 

Xiaojian Zhao  (University of Mannheim)
Strategic Mis-selling and Pre-Contractual Cognition  

11:40 - 12:00

Salomon Antoine  (LAGA Université Paris 13)
Large Bandit Games  

Kris De Jaegher  (Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics)
All Purpose Minimal Sufficient Networks in the Threshold Game  

Jason Marden  (California Institute of Technology)
Distributed Welfare Games  

Alexander Matros  (University of Pittsburgh)
Raising Revenue With Raffles: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment  

Attila Ambrus  (Harvard University)
Hierarchical cheap talk  

12:05 - 12:25

Takako Fujiwara-Greve  (Keio University)
Cooperation in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Outside Options  

Dinko Dimitrov  (University of Munich)
How to Connect under Incomplete Information  

Nichalin Suakkaphong  (University of Arizona)
Competition and Cooperation in Decentralized Distribution  

Ping Zhang  (University of Nottingham)
Collusion in Share Auctions: Mechanism Design and Communication among Bidders  

 

12:25 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Michihiro Kandori  (University of Tokyo)
Revision Games

 

Session A:Applications
Chair: Ahmet Sahin

Session B:Learning and Evolution
Chair: Burkhard C. Schipper

Session C:Incomplete Information
Chair: Akira Yokotani

Session D: Social and Political
Chair: Yukio Koriyama

Session E:Auctions
Chair: Zhen Xu

14:50 - 15:10

Andrey Garnaev  (Saint Petersburg State University)
Jamming in Wireless Networks with Cooperative Jammers  

Emin Dokumaci  (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Schelling Redux: An Evolutionary Dynamic Model of Residential Segregation  

Min Kim  (University of Southern California)
Information Asymmetry and Incentives for Active Management  

Brent Hickman  (University of Iowa)
Effort, Achievement Gaps, and Affirmative Action: A New Look at College Admissions  

Ram Orzach  (Oakland University)
Revenue Comparison in Common-Value Auctions: Two Examples  

15:15 - 15:35

Shi-Miin Liu  (National Taipei University)
Commitment or No-Commitment to Monitoring in Emission Tax Systems?  

Marek Kaminski  (University of California, Irvine)
Generalized Backward Induction  

Eduardo Perez  (Stanford University)
Competing with Equivocal Information: The Importance of Weak Candidates  

Matias Iaryczower  (California Institute of Technology)
Choosing Records: Flip-Flops and Cronies  

Brennan Platt  (Brigham Young University)
Pay-to-Bid Auctions  

15:40 - 16:00

Ahmet Sahin  (Kahramanmaras Sutcu Imam University)
An Application of Game Theory to Producers in Competition with Production and Market Price Risks: The Case of Turkey  

Burkhard C Schipper  (University of California, Davis)
Unbeatable Imitation  

Akira Yokotani  (University of Rochester)
The Sequential Belief Representation of Harsanyi Type Spaces with Redundancy  

Yukio Koriyama  (Ecole Polytechnique)
Freedom to Not Join: A Voluntary Participation Game of a Discrete Public Good  

Zhen Xu  (Stony Brook University)
The Contrary Effects of Listing Fee  

16:00 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:40

Round Table with participation of Robert Aumann/Sergiu Hart/Ehud Kalai/Eric Maskin/John Nash (moderator)/Roberto Serrano/Yair Tauman and Peyton Young

 

Friday, July 17

8:45 - 9:00

Breakfast

9:00 - 9:45

Shmuel Zamir  (Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case

9:45 - 10:30

Drew Fudenberg  (Harvard University)
Repeated Unknown Games

10:30 - 11:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A:Social and Political
Chair: Guillermo Flores

Session B: Contests
Chair: Subhasish Modak Chowdhury

Session C: Solution Concepts
Chair: SangMok Lee

Session D: Stochastic Games
Chair: Eran Shmaya

Session E: Experimental Economics
Chair: Karl Schlag

11:15 - 11:35

David Laurens Bijl  (Delft University of Technology)
A Model of Consensus in the European Commission  

Magnus Hoffmann  (University of Magdeburg)
Do I Want It All? A Simple Model of Satiation in Contests  

Konrad Grabiszewski  (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)
Procedural Type Spaces  

Nagarajan Krishnamurthy  (Chennai Mathematical Institute, India)
Orderfield Property of Stochastic Games via Dependency Graphs  

 

11:40 - 12:00

Micael Ehn  (Mälardalen University)
Why Social Stratification is to be Expected  

Dylan Minor  (University of California, Berkeley)
When Second Best is Best: on the Optimality of Offering a Larger Second Prize  

Kamalakar Karlapalem  (International Institute of Information Technology, Hyderabad, India)
Games with Minimalistic Agents  

Rida Laraki  (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Ecole Polytechnique)
Explicit Formulas for Repeated Games with Absorbing States  

Dorothea Herreiner  (Loyola Marymount University)
Do Intentions Matter for Empowerment? Procedural Justice in Simple Bargaining Games  

12:05 - 12:25

Guillermo Flores  (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)
Corruption Efficiency: Corruptible Bureaucratic Systems and Implementation of Governmental Solutions  

Subhasish Modak Chowdhury  (Purdue University)
The All-pay Auction with Non-monotonic Payoff  

SangMok Lee  (California Institute of Technology)
The Testable Implications of Zero-sum Games  

Eran Shmaya  (Kellogg School of Management)
The Determinacy of Infinite Games with Eventual Perfect Monitoring  

Karl Schlag  (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Can Sanctions Induce Pessimism? An Experiment  

12:25 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Ehud Kalai  (Northwestern University)
A cooperative/competitive solution to a class of strategic games

 

Session A:Social Choice
Chair: Jung You

Session B: Repeated Games
Chair: John Smith

Session C: Miscellaneous
Chair: Duygu Yengin

 

 

14:50 - 15:10

Geoffroy De Clippel  (Brown University)
Egalitarianism and Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information  

Yakov Babichenko  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality.)
Completely Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium  

Adam (Tauman) Kalai  (Microsoft Research)
Bargaining in Strategic Games with Private Information  

 

 

15:15 - 15:35

Jung You  (Rice University)
Envy-free and Incentive Compatible division of a commodity  

Nobue Suzuki  (Komazawa University)
Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Shared Belief  

Laurent Mathevet  (University of Texas at Austin)
Designing Stable Mechanisms in Economic Environments  

 

 

15:40 - 16:00

 

John Smith  (Rutgers-Camden)
Not So Cheap Talk: A Model of Advice with Communication Costs  

Duygu Yengin  (University of Adelaide)
Appointment Games in Fixed-Route Traveling Salesman Problems and The Shapley Value  

 

 

16:00 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Bernhard Von Stengel  (London School of Economics)
Pathways to Equilibria, Pretty Pictures and Diagrams (PPAD)

 

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