Saturday, July 8

10:30 - 11:00

Coffee

11:00 - 11:50

Gareth Donald Myles  (University of Exeter)
Announcements or Contribution? The Relative Efficiency of Manipulated Lindahl Mechanisms  

12:00 - 12:50

Marta Faias  (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
A Strategic Model of Club Formation; Existence and Characterization of Equilibrium  

12:50 - 2:30

Lunch Break

2:30 - 3:20

Licun Xue  (McGill University)
Negotiation and Efficiency  

3:20 - 3:50

Coffee Break

3:50 - 4:40

Sergio Currarini  (Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia)
Information Sharing Networks  

4:50 - 5:40

Isa Emin Hafalir  (Pennsylvania State University)
Efficiency in Coalition Games with Externalities  

6:00 - 10:00

Reception Dinner

Sunday, July 9

8:30 - 9:15

Nicola Persico  (University of Pennsylvania)
Public Goods, Redistribution, and Constitutional Design  

9:15 - 9:25

Coffee Break

9:25 - 10:10

Alessandra Casella  (Columbia University)
A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda  

10:10 - 10:20

Coffee Break

10:20 - 11:05

John Conley  (Vanderbilt University)
Endogenous Games and Equilibrium Adaptation of Social Norms and Ethical Constraints  

11:10 - 11:55

Steven Matthews  (University of Pennsylvania)
Smooth Monotone Contribution Games  

11:55 - 12:25

Lunch Break

12:25 - 1:10

Hideo Konishi  (Boston College)
Tiebout's Tale in Spatial Economies: Entrepreneurship, Self-Selection and Efficiency  

1:15 - 2:00

Nizar Allouch  (Queen Mary, University of London)
Price Taking Equilibrium in Club Economies with Multiple Memberships and Unbounded Club Sizes