Monday, July 10

8:30 - 9:00

9:00 - 9:45

Jean-Francois Mertens  (Université catholique de Louvain)
Intergenerational Equity and the Discount Rate for Cost-Benefit Analysis.
Chair: William Thomson

9:45 - 10:30

William Thomson  (University of Rochester)
Borrowing-Proofness for Assignment Games
Chair: Jean-Francois Mertens

10:30 - 10:55

10:30 - 10:55

Dynamic Games
Filomena Garcia  (ISEG Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa)
Technology adoption with forward looking agents

Incomplete Information
Andrey Garnaev  (Saint Petersburg State University)
On an Inspection Game with a Fine

Incomplete Information
Antonio Jimenez-Martinez  (Universidad de Guanajuato)
A Model of Interim Information Sharing under Incomplete Information

Other
George McMillan  (Impact Analytics)
An Integrated Causal Model for the Social and Psychological Sciences

Solution Concepts
Ricardo Nieva  (University of New Brunswick Saint John)
Sequentially Nash Credible Joint Plans in Strategic Networks

Incomplete Information
Megha Watugala  (Texas A&M University)
First-Best Allocations & the Signup Game: A New Look at Incomplete Information

Session A:
Social and Political Models and Coalition Formation
Chair: John Conley

Session B:
Bargaining
Chair: Uri Weiss

Session C:
Experimental Economics
Chair: Maja Vujovic

Session D:
Information and Networks
Chair: Scott Moser

Session E:
Auctions
Chair: Ron Lavi

10:55 - 11:20

Laurent Alexandre Mathevet  (California Institute of Technology)
Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes  

Andreas Westermark  
Bargaining with Externalities  

Awni Mufleh  (Associate Research Scientist)
Decision Making in Presence of Risk: Prospect Theory Applications in Kuwaiti Students Case  

Ricardo Nieva  (University of New Brunswick Saint John)
An Analytical Solution for Networks of Oldest Friends  

Anna Rubinchik-Pessach  (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Contests with Heterogeneous Agents  

11:20 - 11:45

John Conley  (Vanderbilt University)
Leadership and Coalition Formation  

Uri Weiss  (Tel Aviv)
The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty  

Maja Vujovic  (faculty of economics)
Strategic Decision-Making Using Game Theory  

Scott Moser  (Cargenie Mellon University)
Efficiency, Networks and Evolution of Conventions  

Ron Lavi  (California Institute of Technology)
Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items  

Session A:
Applications and Finance
Chair: Ana Babus

Session B:
Solution Concepts
Chair: Myrna Wooders

Session C:
Cooperative Games
Chair: Dinko Dimitrov

Session D:
Information and Networks
Arun Sundararajan

Session E:
Matching
Chair: Flip Klijn

11:45 - 12:10

Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care, and Litigation Outcomes  

Filomena Garcia  (ISEG Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa)
Endogenous heterogeneity in strategic models: symmetry breaking via strategic substitutes and nonconcavities  

Silvia De la Sierra  (ITAM)
Factors contribution to poverty index FGT2: An application of Cooperative Games  

Aljaz Ule  (University of Amsterdam)
Network formation and cooperation in finitely repeated games  

Pablo Revilla  (Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla)
Many-to-one Matching When Colleagues Matter  

12:10 - 12:35

Ana Babus  (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
A Model of Network Formation in the Banking System  

Myrna Wooders  (Vanderbilt University and University of Warwick)
Correlated Subjective Equilibrium with Stereotyping  

Dinko Dimitrov  (Bielefeld University)
Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core  

Arun Sundararajan  (New York University)
Local Network Effects and Complex Network Structure  

Flip Klijn  (Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC))
Fairness in a Student Placement Mechanism with Restrictions on the Revelation of Preferences  

12:35 - 2:00

2:00 - 2:45

Alvin Roth  (Harvard University)
The Design of School Choice Systems in NYC and Boston: The Game-Theoretic Issues
Chair: Marilda Sotomayor

Session A:
Cost Sharing
Chair: Jesse Schwartz

Session B:
Industrial Organization
Chair: Yutian Chen

Session C:
Finance, and Learning and Evolution
Chair: Andrew de Oliveira

Session D:
Market Games and Auctions
Chair: Alexander Matros

Session E:
Dynamic Games and Stochastic Games
Chair: Magnus Hennlock

2:50 - 3:15

Maurice Koster  (University of Amsterdam)
Consistent cost sharing and rationing  

Guilherme Pereira de Freitas  (IMPA)
Collusion and entry deterrence in a patent-thicket industry  

Fausto Mignanego  (Catholic University of Milan)
American Options in Incomplete Markets  

Jee-Hyeong Park  (Seoul National University)
Private Trigger Strategies in the Presence of Concealed Trade Barriers  

William Sudderth  (University of Minnesota)
Subgame perfect equilibria for stochastic games  

3:15 - 3:40

Jesse Schwartz  (Kennesaw State University)
A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing  

Yutian Chen  (Stony Brook University)
Entry Deterrence through Strategic Sourcing  

André De Oliveira  (Universidade de Brasília)
Leading by Example: A Bi-population Approach  

Alexander Matros  (University of Pittsburgh)
Contest when the winner gets her effort reimbursed  

Magnus Hennlock  (Gothenburg University)
Coasean Bargaining Games with Stochastic Stock Externalities  

3:40 - 4:05

Session A:
Voting Rules and their Effects
Organizer/Chair: Steven Brams

Session B:
Networks: Stability and Equilibrium
Organizer/Chair: Frank Page

Session C:
Cost Sharing
Organizer: Herve Moulin
Chair: Geoffroy De Clippel

Session D:
Experimental Economics
Organizer/Chair: David Cooper

Session E:
Game Theory Applications
Organizer/Chair: Amparo Urbano

4:05 - 4:40

Cesar Martinelli  (ITAM)
Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior  

Daniel Hojman  (Harvard University)
Core and Periphery in Endogenous Networks  

Hatice Ozsoy  (Rice University)
A characterization of Bird's rule  

Brit Grosskopf  (Texas A&M University)
Is Reputation Good or Bad? An Experiment  

Coralio Ballester  (Universidad de Alicante)
Interaction Patterns with Hidden Complementarities  

4:40 - 5:15

Vincent Conitzer  (Carnegie Mellon University)
Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate  

Vincent Vannetelbosch  (CORE)
Farsightedly Stable Networks  

Ruben Juarez  (Rice University)
The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority vs. average cost  

Dmitry Shapiro  (Yale University)
Separating non-monetary and strategic motives in public good games  

Antonio Morales  (University of Malaga)
Complexity constraints in two armed bandit problems: an example  

5:15 - 5:50

Steven Brams  (New York University)
Voting Systems That Combine Approval and Preference  

Frank H. Page, Jr.  (University of Alabama)
Club Formation Games with Farsighted Agents  

Geoffroy De Clippel  (Rice University)
Impartial Division of a Dollar  

David Cooper  (Case Western Reserve)
Non-Linear and Asymmetric Contracts: An Experimental Study of Overcoming Coordination Failure  

Amparo Urbano  (University of Valencia)
Communication through Noisy Channels  

5:55 - 6:40

Andreu Mas-Colell  (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Multilateral bargaining from the strategic form
Chair: Alvin Roth

Tuesday, July 11

8:30 - 9:00

9:00 - 9:45

Ken Binmore  (University College London)
Rational Decision Theory in a Large World
Chair: Ehud Kalai

9:45 - 10:30

Ehud Kalai  (Northwestern University)
Price Stability in Large Market Games
Chair: Ken Binmore

10:30 - 10:55

Session A:
Market Games and Matching
Chair: Peter Biro

Session B:
Signalling and Searching and Cost Sharing
Chair: Geoffroy De Clippel

Session C:
Mechanism Design
Chair: Nolan Miller

Session D:
Fairness and Equilibrium in Voting Games
Chair: Humberto Llavador

Session E:
Coalition Formation
Chair: Ana Mauleon

10:55 - 11:20

Bertrand Gobillard  (PSE and University Paris 10 Nanterre)
How large to be on a market? On (in)effective price dispersed arbitrage opportunities.  

Satoru Takahashi  (Harvard University)
Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state space  

Hsien-Hung Chiu  (Stony Brook University)
An Optimal Budget-Constrained Mechanism with Multiple Liquidity-Constrained Agents  

Michal Krawczyk  (University of Amsterdam)
It hurts more to lose an unfair game. On dynamic psychological games of fairness.  

Krzysztof Apt  (CWI)
Stable partitions in coalitional games  

11:20 - 11:45

Péter Biró  (Budapest University of Technology and Economics)
On the dynamics of stable matching markets  

Geoffroy De Clippel  (Rice University)
Axiomatic Solutions to a Simple Commons Problem  

Nolan Miller  (Harvard University)
Efficient Design with Multidimensional Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations  

Humberto Llavador  (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Voting with Preferences over Margins of Victory  

Ana Mauleon  (Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis)
Contractually Stable Networks  

Session A:
Auctions
Chair: Luciano De Castro

Session B:
Bounded Rationality
Chair: Ita Falk

Session C:
Incomplete Information and Knowledge and Expectations
Chair: Maxim Ivanov

Session D:
Contracts
Chair: Kurt Annen

Session E:
Repeated Games and Matching
Chair: David Cantala

11:45 - 12:10

Joe Podwol  (Cornell University)
Why Use a 99-cent Reserve Price on eBay?  

Daniel Monte  (Yale University)
Reputation and Bounded Memory  

Olivier Gossner  (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques)
Ascertaining irrationality: modeler's vs agent's prospective  

Felix Munoz-Garcia  (University of Pittsburgh)
Information gathering in common agency games  

Alberto Adrego Pinto  (Faculdade de Ciencias da Universidade do Porto)
Dynamics of R&D investment strategies in duopoly competitions  

12:10 - 12:35

Luciano De Castro  (Carlos III University)
Affiliation, Positive Dependence and Linkage Principle  

Ita Falk  (Harvard University)
War and Evolution  

Maxim Ivanov  (Pennsylvania State University)
Optimal Strategic Communication: Can a Less Informed Expert be More Informative?  

Kurt Annen  (University of Guelph)
Efficiency out of Disorder -- Contested Ownership in Incomplete Contracts  

David Cantala  (El Colegio de Mexico)
Welfare and stability in senior matching markets  

12:35 - 2:00

2:00 - 2:45

Francoise Forges  (Universite Paris Dauphine)
Revealed Preferences in Market Games
Chair: Michael Maschler

Session A:
Industrial Organization and Contracts
Chair: Dragan Filipovich

Session B:
Market Games
Chair: Massimo De Francesco

Session C:
Bargaining and Matchings
Chair: Krishna Ladha

Session D:
Cooperative Games
Chair: Cori Vilella

Session E:
Refinements
Chair: Matteo Migheli

2:50 - 3:15

Malgorzata Knauff  (Warsaw School of Economics)
Market transparency and Bertrand competition  

Farhad Husseinov  (Bilkent University, Ankara)
Existence of equilibrium, core and fair allocation in a heterogeneous divisible commodity exchange economy  

Alessandro Marchesiani  (University of Tor Vergata)
Search, bargaining and prices in an enlarged monetary union  

Richard Zeckhauser  (Harvard University)
The Elasticity of Trust: Evidence from Kuwait, Oman, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates and the United States  

Pei-yu Lo  (Yale University)
Common Knowledge of Language and Iterative Admissibility in a Sender-Receiver Game  

3:15 - 3:40

Dragan Filipovich  (El Colegio de Mexico)
Constitutions as Self-Enforcing Redistributive Schemes  

Massimo De Francesco  (University of Siena)
Endogenous entry under Bertrand-Edgeworth and Cournot competition with capacity indivisibility  

Krishna Ladha  (University of Mississippi)
The Origin of Elections: An Economic Explanation  

Cori Vilella  (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)
Strong constrained egalitarian allocations: How to find them  

Matteo Migheli  (University of Torino and Catholic University of Leuven)
The Importance of Formal and Informal Networks on Generalized Trust in Flanders: an Experimental Approach to Social Capital  

Session A:
Industrial Organization
Chair: Veronika Grimm

Session B:
Computation
Chair: Thang Nguyen

Session C:
Bargaining
Chair: Rene Saran

Session D:
Incomplete Information
Chair: Ezra Einy

Session E:
Auctions
Chair: Tymofiy Mylovanov

3:40 - 4:05

Joao Montez  
Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice?  

Felix Brandt  (University of Munich)
On Strictly Competitive Multi-Player Games  

Huan Xie  (University of Pittsburgh)
Repeated Bargaining under Uncertainty of Value Distribution  

Jose Alvaro Rodrigues Neto  (Central Bank of Brasilia)
From Posteriors to Priors via Cycles  

Andriy Zapechelnyuk  (The Hebrew University)
Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator  

4:05 - 4:30

Veronika Grimm  (University of Cologne)
Capacity Choice under Uncertainty: The Impact of Market Structure  

Thang Nguyen  (University of Texas at Austin)
Technological Progress in Races for Product Supremacy  

Rene Saran  (Brown University)
In Bargaining We Trust  

Ezra Einy  (Ben Gurion University)
Equilibrium in a Cournot Duopoly with Asymmetric Information  

Tymofiy Mylovanov  (University of Bonn)
Negative value of information in an informed principal problem with independent private values  

4:30 - 4:45

4:50 - 5:00

Sergiu Hart (Hebrew University)
A brief presentation on Aumann's work

5:00 - 5:45

Robert John Aumann  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
An Index of Riskiness  

5:45 - 5:55

Richard Zeckhauser(Harvard University)
A brief presentation on Schelling's work

5:55 - 6:40

Thomas Schelling  (University of Maryland)
Am I a Game Theorist?  

7:00 - 11:00

Wednesday, July 12

8:30 - 9:00

9:00 - 9:45

Roger Myerson  (University of Chicago)
On the Foundations of Institutions
Chair: Vijay Krishna

9:45 - 10:30

Vijay Krishna  (Penn State University)
Auctions with Resale
Chair: Roger Myerson

10:30 - 10:55

10:30 - 10:55

Matching
Ana Paula Martins  (Universidade Catolica Portuguesa)
Calls and Couples: Communication, Connections, Joint –Consumption and Transfer Prices

Promotion Tournament
Felix Munoz-Garcia  (University of Pittsburgh)
'Rising stars' should shine

Refinements
Anton Noskov  (St. Petersburg State University)
The problem of Nash Equilibrium Selection in games of three persons with two strategists

Applications
Jose Alvaro Rodrigues Neto  (Central Bank of Brasilia)
Optimal Target for Future Inflation: A Simple Game-Theoretic Approach

Session A:
Mechanism Design
Chair: Cheng-Zhong Qin

Session B:
Equilibrium in Voting Games and Political Economy
Chair:Mauricio Bugarin

Session C:
Repeated Games
Chair: Miguel Aramendia

Session D:
Social and Political Models
Chair: James Jordan

Session E:
Searching and Incentives, and Learning
Chair: Orit Ronen

10:55 - 11:20

Kfir Eliaz  (New York University)
A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade  

Ines Dagmar Lindner  (Utrecht School of Economics)
A Generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem  

Selcuk Ozyurt  (New York University)
Repeated Games with Forgetful Players  

Fan Wang  (Stony Brook University)
Social Learning and the Role of Authority  

Stephan Lauermann  (Bonn University)
The Efficiency of Decentralized Trading  

11:20 - 11:45

Cheng-Zhong Qin  (UC Santa Barbara)
Bid and Guess: A Nested Mechanism for King Solomon’s Dilemma  

Mauricio Bugarin  (Universidade de Brasília)
Political Budget Cycles in a Fiscal Federation: The Effect of Partisan Voluntary Transfers  

Miguel Aramendia  (Universidad del Pais Vasco, Spain)
Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium  

James Schuyler Jordan  (Penn State)
Power and legitimacy in pillage games  

Orit Ronen  (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Different Learning Methods Under Uncertainty and Uninformed Choice With a Social Planner  

11:50 - 12:35

Michael Maschler  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Solved, Partly Solved and Not Yet Solved Issues in Cooperative Game Theory.
Chair: Martin Shubik

12:35 - 2:00

2:00 - 2:45

Sergiu Hart  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Surely You're Using the Sure-Thing Principle!
Chair: Aloisio Araujo

2:45 - 3:30

Aloísio Araújo  (IMPA and FGV/RJ)
Assymetric Information without a Single Crossing
Chair: Sergiu Hart

3:30 - 4:00

Session A:
Bounded Rationality and Solution Concepts
Chair: Xiao Luo

Session B:
Market Games
Chair: Konstantinos Papadopoulos

Session C:
Experimental Economics
Chair: Jana Vyrastekova

Session D:
Matching and Cooperative Games
Chair: Jun Wako

Session E:
Learning and Evolution
Chair: Ziv Gorodeisky

4:00 - 4:25

Thomas Demuynck  (University of Ghent)
On the Potential of State Dependent Mutations as an Equilibrium Refinement Device  

Régis Breton  (University of Orléans)
Robustness of equilibrium price dispersion in finite market games  

Neslihan Uler  (New York University)
Public Goods Provision in Egalitarian Societies  

Muriel Niederle  (Stanford University)
Signaling in Matching Markets  

Jeff Shamma  (University of California, Los Angeles)
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play with Inertia for Potential Games  

4:25 - 4:50

Xiao Luo  (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)
(Bayesian) Coalitional Rationalizability  

Konstantinos Papadopoulos  (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece)
Exchange Rates and Purchasing Power Parity in Imperfectly Competitive Markets  

Jana Vyrastekova  (Tilburg University)
Coalition formation in a common pool resource game: An experiment  

Jun Wako  (Gakushuin University)
On a non-existence example of a wdom-vNM set in the Shapley-Scarf housing economy  

Ziv Gorodeisky  (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Stability of Mixed Equilibria  

4:55 - 5:40

Martin Shubik  (Yale University)
Game Theory and Mathematical Institutional Economics
Chair: Michael Maschler

5:40 - 6:30

7:00 - 9:00

Thursday, July 13

8:30 - 9:00

9:00 - 9:45

Douglas Gale  (New York University)
Structural Models of Boundedly Rational Behavior
Chair: Bernhard von Stengel

9:45 - 10:30

Bernhard Von Stengel  (London School of Economics)
Games, Geometry and Finding Equilibria
Chair: Douglas Gale

10:30 - 10:55

Session A:
Social and Political Models
Chair: Maxim Nikitin

Session B:
Cooperative Games
Chair: Maria Dementieva

Session C:
Repeated Games
Chair: Marco Scarsini

Session D:
Matching
Chair:

Session E:
Auctions
Chair: Eiichiro Kazumori

10:55 - 11:20

Tatiana Kornienko  (University of Stirling)
Methods of Social Comparison in Games of Status  

Bruno Oliveira  (Universidade do Porto)
The effect of a Prisoner's Dilemma in an Edgeworthian Economy  

Keisuke Nakao  (Boston University)
The Construction of Social Orders and Inter-Ethnic Conflict  

Marek Pycia  (MIT)
Many-to-One Matching without Substitutability  

Jingfeng Lu  (National University of Singapore)
Auctions Design with Private Costs of Valuation Discovery  

11:20 - 11:45

Maxim Nikitin  (ICEF, SU-HSE (Moscow))
Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes Under Court Errors  

Maria Dementieva  (Univ. of Jyvaskyla, Finland)
Solutions Comparing in Multistage Cooperative Games  

Marco Scarsini  (Universita di Torino)
Repeated Games with Public Signal and Bounded Recall  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (The University of Tokyo)
A Strategic Theory of Markets  

Session A:
Social and Political Models
Chair: Cristopher Cotton

Session B:
Incomplete Information
Chair: Eliane Catilina

Session C:
Bargaining
Chair: Ella Segev

Session D:
Learning and Evolution
Chair: Karl Schlag

Session E:
Market Games
Chair: Ben Zissimos

11:45 - 12:10

Jonathan Weinstein  (Northwestern)
Two Notes on the Blotto Game  

Zhen Liu  (Stony Brook University)
On fair information disclosure considering asymmetric information and awareness  

Jeremy Bertomeu  (Carnegie Mellon University)
Coordination and the Non-Cooperative Bargaining Problem  

Yuichi Noguchi  (Kanto Gakuin University)
Bayesian Learning with Bounded Rationality: Convergence to Nash equilibrium  

Rohit Prasad  (MDI, Gurgaon)
Beware of doles: Welfare in a monetary corn model  

12:10 - 12:35

Christopher Cotton  (Cornell University)
Informational Lobbying and Access When Talk Isn't Cheap  

Eliane Catilina  (American University)
What is the Game?  

Ella Segev  (Technion, Israel.)
Reputation for Toughness in Bargaining with Incomplete Information  

Karl Schlag  (European University Institute)
Eleven –Designing Randomized Experiments under Minimax Regret  

12:35 - 2:00

2:00 - 2:45

Dov Samet  (Tel Aviv University)
Where do partitions come from?
Chair: John Nash

2:45 - 3:30

Roberto Serrano  (Brown University)
Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
Chair: Dov Samet

3:30 - 4:00

Session A:
Solution Concepts for Games under Some Restrictions
Organizer/Chair: Irinel Dragan

Session B:
Two-Sided Matching Games
Organizer/Chair: Marilda Sotomayor

Session C:
Mechanism Design
Organizer: Herve Moulin
Chair: Georgy Artemov

Session D:
Voting
Organizer/Chair: Alvaro Sandroni

Session E:
Learning
Organizer/Chair: Peyton Young

4:00 - 4:35

Johannes Rene Van den Brink  (Free University Amsterdam)
Characterisations of the Beta- and the Degree Network Power Measure  

Federico Echenique  (California Institute of Technology)
What Matchings can be Stable? The Refutability of Matching Theory  

Humberto Moreira  (EPGE)
Common Agency with Informed Principals  

Marco Battaglini  (Princeton University)
The Swing Voter's Curse in The Laboratory  

Ed Hopkins  (Edinburgh University)
Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria  

4:35 - 5:10

Michael Mandler  (Royal Holloway College, University of London)
Strategies as states  

Elena Inarra  (University of the Basque Country)
Absorbing sets for roommate problems with strict preferences  

Paul Schweinzer  (University of Bonn)
When queueing is better than push and shove  

John Morgan  (University of California, Berkeley)
Efficient Information Aggregation with Costly Voting  

William Sandholm  (University of Wisconsin)
Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics  

5:10 - 5:45

Irinel Dragan  (University of Texas)
An alternative coalitional rationality concept for Semivalues of TU games  

Fuhito Kojima  (Harvard University)
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets  

Georgy Artemov  (Brown University)
Imminent Nash Implementation  

Alvaro Sandroni  (University of Pennsylvania)
The pivotal-vote model  

Thomas Norman  (Oxford University)
Learning, Hypothesis Testing and the Folk Theorem  

5:45 - 6:30

John Nash  (Princeton University)
Continued Studies of the Agencies Method for Modeling Coalitions and Cooperation in Games
Chair: Robert Aumann

Friday, July 14

8:30 - 9:00

9:00 - 9:45

Abraham Neyman  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Repeated Games with Bounded Complexity
Chair: Pradeep Dubey

9:45 - 10:30

Pradeep Dubey  (SUNY at Stony Brook)
Competing for Customers in a Social Network
Chair: Abraham Neyman

10:30 - 10:55

Session A:
Auctions
Chair: Hadi Yetkas

Session B:
Cooperative Games
Chair: Emiko Fukuda

Session C:
Matching
Chair: Mohammad Mahdian

Session D:
Implementation
Chair: Sushil Bikhchandani

Session E:
Knowledge and Expectations
Chair: Peter Streufert

10:55 - 11:20

Marco Faravelli  (University of Edinburgh)
The Important Thing Is not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests  

Francisco Sanchez Sanchez  (CIMAT)
Values for Team Games  

Claus-Jochen Haake  (IMW / Bielefeld University)
Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts  

Takashi Kunimoto  (McGill University)
On the Non-Robustness of Nash Implementation  

Elias Tsakas  (University of Göteborg)
Is partitional information always correct?  

11:20 - 11:45

Hadi Yektas  (University of Pittsburgh)
Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers  

Emiko Fukuda  (National Defense Academy in Japan)
Cores for cooperative investment games  

Mohammad Mahdian  (Microsoft Research)
Marriage, Honesty, and Stability  

Sushil Bikhchandani  (UCLA)
Ex Post Implementation in Environments with Private Goods  

Peter Streufert  (University of Western Ontario)
Characterizing Consistency with Monomials  

11:50 - 12:35

Rabah Amir  (Université catholique de Louvain)
Discounted Supermodular Stochastic Games: Theory and Applications
Chair: Yair Tauman

12:30 - 2:00

2:00 - 2:45

Andrew Postlewaite  (University of Pennsylvania)
Pricing Matching Markets
Chair: Shmuel Zamir

2:45 - 3:30

Shmuel Zamir  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Playing Against the Field and ``Visibility'' of Mixed Strategies
Chair: Andrew Postlewaite

3:30 - 4:00

Session A:
Implementation, Information and Networks
Chair: Andrei Karavaev

Session B:
Auctions
Chair: Yong Sui

Session C:
Bounded Rationality
Chair: Kevin Hasker

Session D:
Coalition Formation and Learning
Chair: Lingling Zhang

Session E:
Computation
Chair: Felix Brandt

4:00 - 4:25

Javier Arin  (The Basque Country University)
Coalitional games with veto players: sequential proposals, nucleolus and Nash outcomes  

Ernest Kong-Wah Lai  (University of Pittsburgh)
Contest Architecture with Performance Revelation  

Peter Engseld  (Lund University)
Conventions in a Spatial Environment  

Rajiv Sarin  (Texas A&M University)
Learning and Risk Aversion  

Andrew Gilpin  (Carnegie Mellon University)
A competitive Texas Hold'em poker player via automated abstraction and real-time equilibrium computation  

4:25 - 4:50

Andrei P Karavaev  (The Pennsylvania State University)
Information Trading in Social Networks  

Yong Sui  (University of Pittsburgh)
All-Pay Auction with a Resale Market  

Kevin Hasker  (Bilkent University)
Learning to play (Mixed) Equilibrium using Best Response Learning Dynamics.  

Lingling Zhang  (McGill University)
Bidding and Coalition Formation in Environments with Externalities  

Felix Brandt  (University of Munich)
Symmetries and Efficient Solvability in Multi-Player Games  

Session A:
Auctions
Chair: Nicole Immorlica

Session B:
Bargaining
Chair: Ana Paula Martins

Session C:
Experimental Economics
Chair: Hideki Fujiyama

Session D:
Industtrial Organization
Chair: Felix Vardy

Session E:
Signalling and Fairness
Chair: Dorothea Herreiner

4:50 - 5:15

Jingfeng Lu  (National University of Singapore)
When and How to Dismantle Nuclear Weapons  

Duozhe Li  (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Coalition-Proof Bargaining  

Aniruddha Bagchi  (Vanderbilt University)
A Laboratory Test of an Auction with Negative Externalities  

Abhijit Sengupta  (Unilever Corporate Research, UK)
Achieving Efficiency in an Oligopoly under Incomplete Information  

Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos  (Federal University of Rio Grande)
Design of contracts by the Brazilian antitrust authority: the case of the cease-and-desist commitment (CCP)  

5:15 - 5:40

Nicole Immorlica  (Microsoft Research/MIT)
Discriminatory pricing schemes in ascending auctions with anonymous bidders  

Ana Paula Martins  (Universidade Catolica Portuguesa)
Ideals in Sequential Bargaining Structures  

Hideki Fujiyama  (Dokkyo University)
Decisions on Exits : A Social Dilemma Experiment with Intergroup Mobility  

Felix Vardy  (International Monetary Fund)
The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly  

Dorothea Herreiner  (Loyola Marymount University)
The Relevance of Envy Freeness as Fairness Criterion  

5:45 - 6:30

Lloyd Shapley  (University of California, Los Angeles)
Selected Short Subjects
Chair: Rabah Amir