Monday, July 10 |
8:30 - 9:00 |
Breakfast
|
|
Plenary Sessions
|
9:00 - 9:45 |
Jean-Francois Mertens
(Université catholique de Louvain)
Intergenerational Equity and the Discount Rate for Cost-Benefit Analysis.
Chair: William Thomson
|
9:45 - 10:30 |
William Thomson
(University of Rochester)
Borrowing-Proofness for Assignment Games
Chair: Jean-Francois Mertens
|
10:30 - 10:55 |
Coffee Break
|
10:30 - 10:55 |
Poster Session
|
|
Dynamic Games
Filomena Garcia
(ISEG Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa)
Technology adoption with forward looking agents
|
Incomplete Information
Andrey Garnaev
(Saint Petersburg State University)
On an Inspection Game with a Fine
|
Incomplete Information
Antonio Jimenez-Martinez
(Universidad de Guanajuato)
A Model of Interim Information Sharing under Incomplete Information
|
Other
George McMillan
(Impact Analytics)
An Integrated Causal Model for the Social and Psychological Sciences
|
Solution Concepts
Ricardo Nieva
(University of New Brunswick Saint John)
Sequentially Nash Credible Joint Plans in Strategic Networks
|
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Incomplete Information
Megha Watugala
(Texas A&M University)
First-Best Allocations & the Signup Game: A New Look at Incomplete Information
|
|
|
|
|
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Contributed Papers Parallel Sessions
|
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Session A: Social and Political Models and Coalition Formation Chair: John Conley
|
Session B: Bargaining Chair: Uri Weiss
|
Session C: Experimental Economics Chair: Maja Vujovic
|
Session D: Information and Networks Chair: Scott Moser
|
Session E: Auctions Chair: Ron Lavi
|
10:55 - 11:20 |
Laurent Alexandre Mathevet
(California Institute of Technology)
Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes
|
Andreas Westermark
Bargaining with Externalities
|
Awni Mufleh
(Associate Research Scientist)
Decision Making in Presence of Risk: Prospect Theory Applications in Kuwaiti Students Case
|
Ricardo Nieva
(University of New Brunswick Saint John)
An Analytical Solution for Networks of Oldest Friends
|
Anna Rubinchik-Pessach
(University of Colorado at Boulder)
Contests with Heterogeneous Agents
|
11:20 - 11:45 |
John Conley
(Vanderbilt University)
Leadership and Coalition Formation
|
Uri Weiss
(Tel Aviv)
The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty
|
Maja Vujovic
(faculty of economics)
Strategic Decision-Making Using Game Theory
|
Scott Moser
(Cargenie Mellon University)
Efficiency, Networks and Evolution of Conventions
|
Ron Lavi
(California Institute of Technology)
Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items
|
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Session A: Applications and Finance Chair: Ana Babus
|
Session B: Solution Concepts Chair: Myrna Wooders
|
Session C: Cooperative Games Chair: Dinko Dimitrov
|
Session D: Information and Networks Arun Sundararajan
|
Session E: Matching Chair: Flip Klijn
|
11:45 - 12:10 |
Maxim Nikitin (ICEF, SU-HSE (Moscow))
Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care, and Litigation Outcomes
|
Filomena Garcia
(ISEG Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa)
Endogenous heterogeneity in strategic models: symmetry breaking via strategic substitutes and nonconcavities
|
Silvia De la Sierra
(ITAM)
Factors contribution to poverty index FGT2: An application of Cooperative Games
|
Aljaz Ule
(University of Amsterdam)
Network formation and cooperation in finitely repeated games
|
Pablo Revilla
(Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla)
Many-to-one Matching When Colleagues Matter
|
12:10 - 12:35 |
Ana Babus
(Erasmus University Rotterdam)
A Model of Network Formation in the Banking System
|
Myrna Wooders
(Vanderbilt University and University of Warwick)
Correlated Subjective Equilibrium with Stereotyping
|
Dinko Dimitrov
(Bielefeld University)
Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core
|
Arun Sundararajan
(New York University)
Local Network Effects and Complex Network Structure
|
Flip Klijn
(Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC))
Fairness in a Student Placement Mechanism with Restrictions on the Revelation of Preferences
|
12:35 - 2:00 |
Lunch
|
|
Plenary Session
|
2:00 - 2:45 |
Alvin Roth
(Harvard University)
The Design of School Choice Systems in NYC and Boston: The Game-Theoretic Issues
Chair: Marilda Sotomayor
|
|
Contributed Papers Parallel Sessions
|
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Session A: Cost Sharing Chair: Jesse Schwartz
|
Session B: Industrial Organization Chair: Yutian Chen
|
Session C: Finance, and Learning and Evolution Chair: Andrew de Oliveira
|
Session D: Market Games and Auctions Chair: Alexander Matros
|
Session E: Dynamic Games and Stochastic Games Chair: Magnus Hennlock
|
2:50 - 3:15 |
Maurice Koster
(University of Amsterdam)
Consistent cost sharing and rationing
|
Guilherme Pereira de Freitas
(IMPA)
Collusion and entry deterrence in a patent-thicket industry
|
Fausto Mignanego
(Catholic University of Milan)
American Options in Incomplete Markets
|
Jee-Hyeong Park
(Seoul National University)
Private Trigger Strategies in the Presence of Concealed Trade Barriers
|
William Sudderth
(University of Minnesota)
Subgame perfect equilibria for stochastic games
|
3:15 - 3:40 |
Jesse Schwartz
(Kennesaw State University)
A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing
|
Yutian Chen
(Stony Brook University)
Entry Deterrence through Strategic Sourcing
|
André De Oliveira
(Universidade de Brasília)
Leading by Example: A Bi-population Approach
|
Alexander Matros
(University of Pittsburgh)
Contest when the winner gets her effort reimbursed
|
Magnus Hennlock
(Gothenburg University)
Coasean Bargaining Games with Stochastic Stock Externalities
|
3:40 - 4:05 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Special Parallel Sessions
|
|
Session A: Voting Rules and their Effects Organizer/Chair: Steven Brams
|
Session B: Networks: Stability and Equilibrium Organizer/Chair: Frank Page
|
Session C: Cost Sharing Organizer: Herve Moulin Chair: Geoffroy De Clippel
|
Session D: Experimental Economics Organizer/Chair: David Cooper
|
Session E: Game Theory Applications Organizer/Chair: Amparo Urbano
|
4:05 - 4:40 |
Cesar Martinelli
(ITAM)
Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior
|
Daniel Hojman
(Harvard University)
Core and Periphery in Endogenous Networks
|
Hatice Ozsoy
(Rice University)
A characterization of Bird's rule
|
Brit Grosskopf
(Texas A&M University)
Is Reputation Good or Bad? An Experiment
|
Coralio Ballester
(Universidad de Alicante)
Interaction Patterns with Hidden Complementarities
|
4:40 - 5:15 |
Vincent Conitzer
(Carnegie Mellon University)
Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate
|
Vincent Vannetelbosch
(CORE)
Farsightedly Stable Networks
|
Ruben Juarez
(Rice University)
The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority vs. average cost
|
Dmitry Shapiro
(Yale University)
Separating non-monetary and strategic motives in public good games
|
Antonio Morales
(University of Malaga)
Complexity constraints in two armed bandit problems: an example
|
5:15 - 5:50 |
Steven Brams
(New York University)
Voting Systems That Combine Approval and Preference
|
Frank H. Page, Jr.
(University of Alabama)
Club Formation Games with Farsighted Agents
|
Geoffroy De Clippel
(Rice University)
Impartial Division of a Dollar
|
David Cooper
(Case Western Reserve)
Non-Linear and Asymmetric Contracts: An Experimental Study of Overcoming Coordination Failure
|
Amparo Urbano
(University of Valencia)
Communication through Noisy Channels
|
|
Plenary Session
|
5:55 - 6:40 |
Andreu Mas-Colell
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Multilateral bargaining from the strategic form
Chair: Alvin Roth
|
|
Tuesday, July 11 |
8:30 - 9:00 |
Breakfast
|
|
Plenary Sessions
|
9:00 - 9:45 |
Ken Binmore
(University College London)
Rational Decision Theory in a Large World
Chair: Ehud Kalai
|
9:45 - 10:30 |
Ehud Kalai
(Northwestern University)
Price Stability in Large Market Games
Chair: Ken Binmore
|
10:30 - 10:55 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Contributed Papers Parallel Sessions
|
|
Session A: Market Games and Matching Chair: Peter Biro
|
Session B: Signalling and Searching and Cost Sharing Chair: Geoffroy De Clippel
|
Session C: Mechanism Design Chair: Nolan Miller
|
Session D: Fairness and Equilibrium in Voting Games Chair: Humberto Llavador
|
Session E: Coalition Formation Chair: Ana Mauleon
|
10:55 - 11:20 |
Bertrand Gobillard
(PSE and University Paris 10 Nanterre)
How large to be on a market? On (in)effective price dispersed arbitrage opportunities.
|
Satoru Takahashi
(Harvard University)
Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state space
|
Hsien-Hung Chiu
(Stony Brook University)
An Optimal Budget-Constrained Mechanism with Multiple Liquidity-Constrained Agents
|
Michal Krawczyk
(University of Amsterdam)
It hurts more to lose an unfair game. On dynamic psychological games of fairness.
|
Krzysztof Apt
(CWI)
Stable partitions in coalitional games
|
11:20 - 11:45 |
Péter Biró
(Budapest University of Technology and Economics)
On the dynamics of stable matching markets
|
Geoffroy De Clippel
(Rice University)
Axiomatic Solutions to a Simple Commons Problem
|
Nolan Miller
(Harvard University)
Efficient Design with Multidimensional Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations
|
Humberto Llavador
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Voting with Preferences over Margins of Victory
|
Ana Mauleon
(Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis)
Contractually Stable Networks
|
|
Session A: Auctions Chair: Luciano De Castro
|
Session B: Bounded Rationality Chair: Ita Falk
|
Session C: Incomplete Information and Knowledge and Expectations Chair: Maxim Ivanov
|
Session D: Contracts Chair: Kurt Annen
|
Session E: Repeated Games and Matching Chair: David Cantala
|
11:45 - 12:10 |
Joe Podwol
(Cornell University)
Why Use a 99-cent Reserve Price on eBay?
|
Daniel Monte
(Yale University)
Reputation and Bounded Memory
|
Olivier Gossner
(Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques)
Ascertaining irrationality: modeler's vs agent's prospective
|
Felix Munoz-Garcia
(University of Pittsburgh)
Information gathering in common agency games
|
Alberto Adrego Pinto
(Faculdade de Ciencias da Universidade do Porto)
Dynamics of R&D investment strategies in duopoly competitions
|
12:10 - 12:35 |
Luciano De Castro
(Carlos III University)
Affiliation, Positive Dependence and Linkage Principle
|
Ita Falk
(Harvard University)
War and Evolution
|
Maxim Ivanov
(Pennsylvania State University)
Optimal Strategic Communication: Can a Less Informed Expert be More Informative?
|
Kurt Annen
(University of Guelph)
Efficiency out of Disorder -- Contested Ownership in Incomplete Contracts
|
David Cantala
(El Colegio de Mexico)
Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
|
12:35 - 2:00 |
Lunch
|
|
Plenary Session
|
2:00 - 2:45 |
Francoise Forges
(Universite Paris Dauphine)
Revealed Preferences in Market Games
Chair: Michael Maschler
|
|
Contributed Papers Parallel Sessions
|
|
Session A: Industrial Organization and Contracts Chair: Dragan Filipovich
|
Session B: Market Games Chair: Massimo De Francesco
|
Session C: Bargaining and Matchings Chair: Krishna Ladha
|
Session D: Cooperative Games Chair: Cori Vilella
|
Session E: Refinements Chair: Matteo Migheli
|
2:50 - 3:15 |
Malgorzata Knauff
(Warsaw School of Economics)
Market transparency and Bertrand competition
|
Farhad Husseinov
(Bilkent University, Ankara)
Existence of equilibrium, core and fair allocation in a heterogeneous divisible commodity exchange economy
|
Alessandro Marchesiani
(University of Tor Vergata)
Search, bargaining and prices in an enlarged monetary union
|
Richard Zeckhauser
(Harvard University)
The Elasticity of Trust: Evidence from Kuwait, Oman, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates and the United States
|
Pei-yu Lo
(Yale University)
Common Knowledge of Language and Iterative Admissibility in a Sender-Receiver Game
|
3:15 - 3:40 |
Dragan Filipovich
(El Colegio de Mexico)
Constitutions as Self-Enforcing Redistributive Schemes
|
Massimo De Francesco
(University of Siena)
Endogenous entry under Bertrand-Edgeworth and Cournot competition with capacity indivisibility
|
Krishna Ladha
(University of Mississippi)
The Origin of Elections: An Economic Explanation
|
Cori Vilella
(Universitat Rovira i Virgili)
Strong constrained egalitarian allocations: How to find them
|
Matteo Migheli
(University of Torino and Catholic University of Leuven)
The Importance of Formal and Informal Networks on Generalized Trust in Flanders: an Experimental Approach to Social Capital
|
|
Session A: Industrial Organization Chair: Veronika Grimm
|
Session B: Computation Chair: Thang Nguyen
|
Session C: Bargaining Chair: Rene Saran
|
Session D: Incomplete Information Chair: Ezra Einy
|
Session E: Auctions Chair: Tymofiy Mylovanov
|
3:40 - 4:05 |
Joao Montez
Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice?
|
Felix Brandt
(University of Munich)
On Strictly Competitive Multi-Player Games
|
Huan Xie
(University of Pittsburgh)
Repeated Bargaining under Uncertainty of Value Distribution
|
Jose Alvaro Rodrigues Neto
(Central Bank of Brasilia)
From Posteriors to Priors via Cycles
|
Andriy Zapechelnyuk
(The Hebrew University)
Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator
|
4:05 - 4:30 |
Veronika Grimm
(University of Cologne)
Capacity Choice under Uncertainty: The Impact of Market Structure
|
Thang Nguyen
(University of Texas at Austin)
Technological Progress in Races for Product Supremacy
|
Rene Saran
(Brown University)
In Bargaining We Trust
|
Ezra Einy
(Ben Gurion University)
Equilibrium in a Cournot Duopoly with Asymmetric Information
|
Tymofiy Mylovanov
(University of Bonn)
Negative value of information in an informed principal problem with independent private values
|
4:30 - 4:45 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Nobel Prize Laureates Session Chair: Marilda Sotomayor
|
4:50 - 5:00 |
Sergiu Hart (Hebrew University) A brief presentation on Aumann's work
|
5:00 - 5:45 |
Robert John Aumann
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
An Index of Riskiness
|
5:45 - 5:55 |
Richard Zeckhauser(Harvard University) A brief presentation on Schelling's work
|
5:55 - 6:40 |
Thomas Schelling
(University of Maryland)
Am I a Game Theorist?
|
7:00 - 11:00 |
Reception, Dinner and Music (Charles B. Wang Center)
|
|
Wednesday, July 12 |
8:30 - 9:00 |
Breakfast
|
|
Plenary Sessions
|
9:00 - 9:45 |
Roger Myerson
(University of Chicago)
On the Foundations of Institutions
Chair: Vijay Krishna
|
9:45 - 10:30 |
Vijay Krishna
(Penn State University)
Auctions with Resale
Chair: Roger Myerson
|
10:30 - 10:55 |
Coffee Break
|
10:30 - 10:55 |
Poster Session
|
|
Matching
Ana Paula Martins
(Universidade Catolica Portuguesa)
Calls and Couples: Communication, Connections, Joint Consumption and Transfer Prices
|
Promotion Tournament
Felix Munoz-Garcia
(University of Pittsburgh)
'Rising stars' should shine
|
Refinements
Anton Noskov
(St. Petersburg State University)
The problem of Nash Equilibrium Selection in games of three persons with two strategists
|
Applications
Jose Alvaro Rodrigues Neto
(Central Bank of Brasilia)
Optimal Target for Future Inflation: A Simple Game-Theoretic Approach
|
|
|
Contributed Papers Parallel Sessions
|
|
Session A: Mechanism Design Chair: Cheng-Zhong Qin
|
Session B: Equilibrium in Voting Games and Political Economy Chair:Mauricio Bugarin
|
Session C: Repeated Games Chair: Miguel Aramendia
|
Session D: Social and Political Models Chair: James Jordan
|
Session E: Searching and Incentives, and Learning Chair: Orit Ronen
|
10:55 - 11:20 |
Kfir Eliaz
(New York University)
A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
|
Ines Dagmar Lindner
(Utrecht School of Economics)
A Generalization of Condorcets Jury Theorem
|
Selcuk Ozyurt
(New York University)
Repeated Games with Forgetful Players
|
Fan Wang
(Stony Brook University)
Social Learning and the Role of Authority
|
Stephan Lauermann
(Bonn University)
The Efficiency of Decentralized Trading
|
11:20 - 11:45 |
Cheng-Zhong Qin
(UC Santa Barbara)
Bid and Guess: A Nested Mechanism for King Solomons Dilemma
|
Mauricio Bugarin
(Universidade de Brasília)
Political Budget Cycles in a Fiscal Federation: The Effect of Partisan Voluntary Transfers
|
Miguel Aramendia
(Universidad del Pais Vasco, Spain)
Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium
|
James Schuyler Jordan
(Penn State)
Power and legitimacy in pillage games
|
Orit Ronen
(The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Different Learning Methods Under Uncertainty and Uninformed Choice With a Social Planner
|
|
Plenary Session
|
11:50 - 12:35 |
Michael Maschler
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Solved, Partly Solved and Not Yet Solved Issues in Cooperative Game Theory.
Chair: Martin Shubik
|
12:35 - 2:00 |
Lunch
|
|
Plenary Sessions
|
2:00 - 2:45 |
Sergiu Hart
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Surely You're Using the Sure-Thing Principle!
Chair: Aloisio Araujo
|
2:45 - 3:30 |
Aloísio Araújo
(IMPA and FGV/RJ)
Assymetric Information without a Single Crossing
Chair: Sergiu Hart
|
3:30 - 4:00 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Contributed Papers Parallel Sessions
|
|
Session A: Bounded Rationality and Solution Concepts Chair: Xiao Luo
|
Session B: Market Games Chair: Konstantinos Papadopoulos
|
Session C: Experimental Economics Chair: Jana Vyrastekova
|
Session D: Matching and Cooperative Games Chair: Jun Wako
|
Session E: Learning and Evolution Chair: Ziv Gorodeisky
|
4:00 - 4:25 |
Thomas Demuynck
(University of Ghent)
On the Potential of State Dependent Mutations as an Equilibrium Refinement Device
|
Régis Breton
(University of Orléans)
Robustness of equilibrium price dispersion in finite market games
|
Neslihan Uler
(New York University)
Public Goods Provision in Egalitarian Societies
|
Muriel Niederle
(Stanford University)
Signaling in Matching Markets
|
Jeff Shamma
(University of California, Los Angeles)
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play with Inertia for Potential Games
|
4:25 - 4:50 |
Xiao Luo
(Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)
(Bayesian) Coalitional Rationalizability
|
Konstantinos Papadopoulos
(Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece)
Exchange Rates and Purchasing Power Parity in Imperfectly Competitive Markets
|
Jana Vyrastekova
(Tilburg University)
Coalition formation in a common pool resource game: An experiment
|
Jun Wako
(Gakushuin University)
On a non-existence example of a wdom-vNM set in the Shapley-Scarf housing economy
|
Ziv Gorodeisky
(The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Stability of Mixed Equilibria
|
|
Plenary Session
|
4:55 - 5:40 |
Martin Shubik
(Yale University)
Game Theory and Mathematical Institutional Economics
Chair: Michael Maschler
|
5:40 - 6:30 |
Open Problems Festival Chair: Peyton Young
|
7:00 - 9:00 |
Soccer Game
|
|
Thursday, July 13 |
8:30 - 9:00 |
Breakfast
|
|
Plenary Sessions
|
9:00 - 9:45 |
Douglas Gale
(New York University)
Structural Models of Boundedly Rational Behavior
Chair: Bernhard von Stengel
|
9:45 - 10:30 |
Bernhard Von Stengel
(London School of Economics)
Games, Geometry and Finding Equilibria
Chair: Douglas Gale
|
10:30 - 10:55 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Contributed Papers Parallel Sessions
|
|
Session A: Social and Political Models Chair: Maxim Nikitin
|
Session B: Cooperative Games Chair: Maria Dementieva
|
Session C: Repeated Games Chair: Marco Scarsini
|
Session D: Matching Chair:
|
Session E: Auctions Chair: Eiichiro Kazumori
|
10:55 - 11:20 |
Tatiana Kornienko
(University of Stirling)
Methods of Social Comparison in Games of Status
|
Bruno Oliveira
(Universidade do Porto)
The effect of a Prisoner's Dilemma in an Edgeworthian Economy
|
Keisuke Nakao
(Boston University)
The Construction of Social Orders and Inter-Ethnic Conflict
|
Marek Pycia
(MIT)
Many-to-One Matching without Substitutability
|
Jingfeng Lu
(National University of Singapore)
Auctions Design with Private Costs of Valuation Discovery
|
11:20 - 11:45 |
Maxim Nikitin
(ICEF, SU-HSE (Moscow))
Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes Under Court Errors
|
Maria Dementieva
(Univ. of Jyvaskyla, Finland)
Solutions Comparing in Multistage Cooperative Games
|
Marco Scarsini
(Universita di Torino)
Repeated Games with Public Signal and Bounded Recall
|
|
Eiichiro Kazumori
(The University of Tokyo)
A Strategic Theory of Markets
|
|
Session A: Social and Political Models Chair: Cristopher Cotton
|
Session B: Incomplete Information Chair: Eliane Catilina
|
Session C: Bargaining Chair: Ella Segev
|
Session D: Learning and Evolution Chair: Karl Schlag
|
Session E: Market Games Chair: Ben Zissimos
|
11:45 - 12:10 |
Jonathan Weinstein
(Northwestern)
Two Notes on the Blotto Game
|
Zhen Liu
(Stony Brook University)
On fair information disclosure considering asymmetric information and awareness
|
Jeremy Bertomeu
(Carnegie Mellon University)
Coordination and the Non-Cooperative Bargaining Problem
|
Yuichi Noguchi
(Kanto Gakuin University)
Bayesian Learning with Bounded Rationality: Convergence to Nash equilibrium
|
Rohit Prasad
(MDI, Gurgaon)
Beware of doles: Welfare in a monetary corn model
|
12:10 - 12:35 |
Christopher Cotton
(Cornell University)
Informational Lobbying and Access When Talk Isn't Cheap
|
Eliane Catilina
(American University)
What is the Game?
|
Ella Segev
(Technion, Israel.)
Reputation for Toughness in Bargaining with Incomplete Information
|
Karl Schlag
(European University Institute)
Eleven Designing Randomized Experiments under Minimax Regret
|
|
12:35 - 2:00 |
Lunch
|
|
Plenary Sessions
|
2:00 - 2:45 |
Dov Samet
(Tel Aviv University)
Where do partitions come from?
Chair: John Nash
|
2:45 - 3:30 |
Roberto Serrano
(Brown University)
Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
Chair: Dov Samet
|
3:30 - 4:00 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Special Parallel Sessions
|
|
Session A: Solution Concepts for Games under Some Restrictions Organizer/Chair: Irinel Dragan
|
Session B: Two-Sided Matching Games Organizer/Chair: Marilda Sotomayor
|
Session C: Mechanism Design Organizer: Herve Moulin Chair: Georgy Artemov
|
Session D: Voting Organizer/Chair: Alvaro Sandroni
|
Session E: Learning Organizer/Chair: Peyton Young
|
4:00 - 4:35 |
Johannes Rene Van den Brink
(Free University Amsterdam)
Characterisations of the Beta- and the Degree Network Power Measure
|
Federico Echenique
(California Institute of Technology)
What Matchings can be Stable? The Refutability of Matching Theory
|
Humberto Moreira
(EPGE)
Common Agency with Informed Principals
|
Marco Battaglini
(Princeton University)
The Swing Voter's Curse in The Laboratory
|
Ed Hopkins
(Edinburgh University)
Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria
|
4:35 - 5:10 |
Michael Mandler
(Royal Holloway College, University of London)
Strategies as states
|
Elena Inarra
(University of the Basque Country)
Absorbing sets for roommate problems with strict preferences
|
Paul Schweinzer
(University of Bonn)
When queueing is better than push and shove
|
John Morgan
(University of California, Berkeley)
Efficient Information Aggregation with Costly Voting
|
William Sandholm
(University of Wisconsin)
Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
|
5:10 - 5:45 |
Irinel Dragan
(University of Texas)
An alternative coalitional rationality concept for Semivalues of TU games
|
Fuhito Kojima
(Harvard University)
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
|
Georgy Artemov
(Brown University)
Imminent Nash Implementation
|
Alvaro Sandroni
(University of Pennsylvania)
The pivotal-vote model
|
Thomas Norman
(Oxford University)
Learning, Hypothesis Testing and the Folk Theorem
|
|
Plenary Session
|
5:45 - 6:30 |
John Nash
(Princeton University)
Continued Studies of the Agencies Method for Modeling Coalitions and Cooperation in Games
Chair: Robert Aumann
|
|
Friday, July 14 |
8:30 - 9:00 |
Breakfast
|
|
Plenary Sessions
|
9:00 - 9:45 |
Abraham Neyman
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Repeated Games with Bounded Complexity
Chair: Pradeep Dubey
|
9:45 - 10:30 |
Pradeep Dubey
(SUNY at Stony Brook)
Competing for Customers in a Social Network
Chair: Abraham Neyman
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10:30 - 10:55 |
Coffee Break
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Contributed Papers Parallel Sessions
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Session A: Auctions Chair: Hadi Yetkas
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Session B: Cooperative Games Chair: Emiko Fukuda
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Session C: Matching Chair: Mohammad Mahdian
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Session D: Implementation Chair: Sushil Bikhchandani
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Session E: Knowledge and Expectations Chair: Peter Streufert
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10:55 - 11:20 |
Marco Faravelli
(University of Edinburgh)
The Important Thing Is not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests
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Francisco Sanchez Sanchez
(CIMAT)
Values for Team Games
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Claus-Jochen Haake
(IMW / Bielefeld University)
Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts
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Takashi Kunimoto
(McGill University)
On the Non-Robustness of Nash Implementation
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Elias Tsakas
(University of Göteborg)
Is partitional information always correct?
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11:20 - 11:45 |
Hadi Yektas
(University of Pittsburgh)
Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
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Emiko Fukuda
(National Defense Academy in Japan)
Cores for cooperative investment games
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Mohammad Mahdian
(Microsoft Research)
Marriage, Honesty, and Stability
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Sushil Bikhchandani
(UCLA)
Ex Post Implementation in Environments with Private Goods
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Peter Streufert
(University of Western Ontario)
Characterizing Consistency with Monomials
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Plenary Session
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11:50 - 12:35 |
Rabah Amir
(Université catholique de Louvain)
Discounted Supermodular Stochastic Games: Theory and Applications
Chair: Yair Tauman
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12:30 - 2:00 |
Lunch
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Plenary Sessions
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2:00 - 2:45 |
Andrew Postlewaite
(University of Pennsylvania)
Pricing Matching Markets
Chair: Shmuel Zamir
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2:45 - 3:30 |
Shmuel Zamir
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Playing Against the Field and ``Visibility'' of Mixed Strategies
Chair: Andrew Postlewaite
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3:30 - 4:00 |
Coffee Break
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Contributed Papers Parallel Sessions
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Session A: Implementation, Information and Networks Chair: Andrei Karavaev
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Session B: Auctions Chair: Yong Sui
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Session C: Bounded Rationality Chair: Kevin Hasker
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Session D: Coalition Formation and Learning Chair: Lingling Zhang
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Session E: Computation Chair: Felix Brandt
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4:00 - 4:25 |
Javier Arin
(The Basque Country University)
Coalitional games with veto players: sequential proposals, nucleolus and Nash outcomes
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Ernest Kong-Wah Lai
(University of Pittsburgh)
Contest Architecture with Performance Revelation
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Peter Engseld
(Lund University)
Conventions in a Spatial Environment
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Rajiv Sarin
(Texas A&M University)
Learning and Risk Aversion
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Andrew Gilpin
(Carnegie Mellon University)
A competitive Texas Hold'em poker player via automated abstraction and real-time equilibrium computation
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4:25 - 4:50 |
Andrei P Karavaev
(The Pennsylvania State University)
Information Trading in Social Networks
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Yong Sui
(University of Pittsburgh)
All-Pay Auction with a Resale Market
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Kevin Hasker
(Bilkent University)
Learning to play (Mixed) Equilibrium using Best Response Learning Dynamics.
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Lingling Zhang
(McGill University)
Bidding and Coalition Formation in Environments with Externalities
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Felix Brandt
(University of Munich)
Symmetries and Efficient Solvability in Multi-Player Games
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Session A: Auctions Chair: Nicole Immorlica
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Session B: Bargaining Chair: Ana Paula Martins
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Session C: Experimental Economics Chair: Hideki Fujiyama
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Session D: Industtrial Organization Chair: Felix Vardy
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Session E: Signalling and Fairness Chair: Dorothea Herreiner
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4:50 - 5:15 |
Jingfeng Lu
(National University of Singapore)
When and How to Dismantle Nuclear Weapons
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Duozhe Li
(Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Coalition-Proof Bargaining
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Aniruddha Bagchi
(Vanderbilt University)
A Laboratory Test of an Auction with Negative Externalities
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Abhijit Sengupta
(Unilever Corporate Research, UK)
Achieving Efficiency in an Oligopoly under Incomplete Information
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Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos
(Federal University of Rio Grande)
Design of contracts by the Brazilian antitrust authority: the case of the cease-and-desist commitment (CCP)
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5:15 - 5:40 |
Nicole Immorlica
(Microsoft Research/MIT)
Discriminatory pricing schemes in ascending auctions with anonymous bidders
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Ana Paula Martins
(Universidade Catolica Portuguesa)
Ideals in Sequential Bargaining Structures
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Hideki Fujiyama
(Dokkyo University)
Decisions on Exits : A Social Dilemma Experiment with Intergroup Mobility
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Felix Vardy
(International Monetary Fund)
The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly
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Dorothea Herreiner
(Loyola Marymount University)
The Relevance of Envy Freeness as Fairness Criterion
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Plenary Sessions
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5:45 - 6:30 |
Lloyd Shapley
(University of California, Los Angeles)
Selected Short Subjects
Chair: Rabah Amir
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