Workshop on Game Theory and Computer Science
Stony Brook, NY, July 20-22, 2005
Schedule of Talks
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Wednesday, July 20
9:00 - 10:00
Silvio Micali (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Universal Mechanism Design
10:00 - 10:30
Éva Tardos (Cornell University) Price of Anarchy for a Network Pricing Game for Selfish Traffic
10:30 - 11:00
Coffee Break
11:00 - 12:00
Sergiu Hart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
12:00 - 3:00
Lunch
3:00 - 3:30
Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University) Approximating Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions
3:30 - 4:00
Vincent Conitzer (Carnegie Mellon University) Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance and Other Solution Concepts
4:00 - 4:30
Andrew G. Gilpin (Carnegie Mellon University) Finding equilibria in large sequential games of incomplete information
4:30 - 5:00
5:00 - 5:30
Paul Valiant (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) TBA
5:30 - 6:00
Abhi Shelat (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) TBA
6:00 - 6:30
Matt Lepinski (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Collusion-Free Protocols
6:30 - 10:00
Reception Dinner at University Cafe
Thursday, July 21
Bernhard Von Stengel (London School of Economics) Geometric Views of Linear Complementarity Algorithms and Their Complexity
Rahul Savani (London School of Economics) Hard-to-solve Bimatrix Games
Yinyu Ye (Stanford University) On Exchange Market Equilibria with Leontief's Utilities: Hardness Results and Hopeful Algorithms
Peter Bro Miltersen (University of Aarhus) Computing Equilibrium Refinements for Zero-sum Games
Kamal Jain (Microsoft Research) TBA
Amy Greenwald (Brown University) Multiagent Value Iteration in Markov Games
Richard Cole (New York University) Toward Discrete Distributed Tatonnement Algorithms for Market Equilibria, part I
Lisa K. Fleischer (IBM) Toward Discrete Distributed Tatonnement Algorithms for Market Equilibria, part II
Vahab S. Mirrokni (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Sink Equilibria and Convergence
Friday, July 22
Ariel Orda (Technion) Over Two Decades of Research on Networking Games
Nahum Shimkin (Technion) Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Routing
11:00 - 11:30
Shie Mannor (McGill University) Calibrated Forecasts: Efficiency versus Universality
11:30 - 12:00
Ramesh Johari (Stanford University) A Contract-Based Model for Directed Network Formation
12:00 - 1:30
1:30 - 2:00
Hisao Kameda (University of Tsukuba) The Degree of a Braess-like Paradox in a Symmetric Network Can Increase without Bound
2:00 - 2:30
Laura Wynter (IBM Research) TBA
2:30 - 2:45
2:45 - 3:15
Parijat Dube (IBM T. J. Watson Research Center) Capacity Planning, Quality of Service and Price Wars
3:15 - 3:45
Nir Andelman (Tel Aviv University) Testing Truthfulness for Single Parameter Agents