The 16th International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 11-15, 2005

Schedule of Talks

Monday, July 11				
8:30 - 9:15	*Breakfast*			
9:15 - 10:05	**Philip J. Reny** (University of Chicago) On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games			
10:10 - 11:00	**Matthew Jackson** (California Institute of Technology) Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games			
11:00 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*			
	Session A: *Contracts*	Session B: *Auctions*	Session C: *Incomplete Information*	Session D: *Networks*
11:30 - 11:55	**Amrita Dhillon** (University of Warwick) Games of Status and Discriminatory Contracts	**Luciano I. De Castro** (IMPA) Pure Strategy Equilibria of Single and Double Auctions with Interdependent Values	**Elias Tsakas** (University of Göteborg, Sweden) Mixed Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games	**Virginie Masson** (Graduate Student University of Pittsburgh) A Spatial Interaction Model with Heterogeneous Agents
12:00 - 12:30	**Harry French** Property Defining and Property Defying Games (PD)	**Eiichiro Kazumori** (Univ. Tokyo) Auctions with Package Bidding: An Experimental Study	**Nathanael Hyafil** (Computer Sc., U. of Toronto) Regret Minimizing Equilibria of Games with Strict Type Uncertainty	**Sylvain Béal** (CREUSET, University of Saint-Etienne) Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation
12:30 - 2:00	*Lunch*			
	Session A: *Cooperative Games*	Session B: *Solution Concepts*	Session C: *Voting*	Session D: *Learning*
2:00 - 2:25	**Barry Feldman** (Prism Analytics and DePaul University) Lost in Translation? Ex Ante Utility and Proportionality in Games	**Xiao Luo** (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taiwan) Iterated Strict Dominance in General Games	**Jean-Francois Laslier** (Ecole Polytechnique) Strategic approval voting in a large electorate	**Yuichi Noguchi** (Kanto Gakuin University) Merging with a Set of Probability Measures
2:30 - 2:55	**Yuan Ju** (Keele University) The Consensus Value for Games in Partition Function Form	**Marzena J. Rostek** (Yale University) Fatalistic Choice Rules	**Eyal Beigman** (Hebrew University) Characterizing Neutral Aggregation on Restricted Domains	**Jeff Shamma** (UCLA) Calibrated forecasts: Efficiency versus Universality
3:00 - 3:30	*Coffee Break*			
3:30 - 4:20	**Eric Maskin** (Institute for Advanced Study and Princeton University) Majority Rule and Strategic Voting			
4:25 - 5:15	**Shmuel Zamir** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) A Model of Bargaining with Incomplete Information			

The first session block also contains a Session E: *Repeated Games* column:

	Session E: *Repeated Games*
11:30 - 11:55	**Dorothea K Herreiner** (Bowdoin College) Bargaining Dynamics and Allocation Choices
12:00 - 12:30	**Galit Ashkenazi-Golan** (Tel-Aviv University) Confession and Pardon in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication

Tuesday, July 12				
8:30 - 9:15	*Breakfast*			
9:15 - 10:05	**Stephen Morris** (Yale University) Robust Mechanism Design			
10:10 - 11:00	**Oliver Hart** (Harvard University and LSE) Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In			
11:00 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*			

	Session A: *Knowledge and Expectations*	Session B: *Bargaining*	Session C: *Incomplete Information*	Session D: *Voting*	Session E: *Finance*
11:30 - 11:55	**Itai Arieli** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Towards a Characterization of Rational Expectations	**Francesca Flamini** (University of Glasgow) Dynamic Accumulation in Bargaining Games	**Ming Li** (Concordia University) Combining Expert Opinions	**Rohit Parikh** (City University of New York) Some Results on Adjusted Winner	**Fan Wang** (Stony Brook University,CHF, Capital Markets) Adaptive Learning and Evolutionary Dynamics in Financial Market
12:00 - 12:30	**Dov Samet** (Tel Aviv University) Deriving Knowledge from Belief	**Federico Valenciano** (Universida del Pais Vasco) Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees	**Jérôme Mathis** (Laboratoire THEMA- Univ. de Cergy- Pontoise) Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences	**Chun-Hsien Yeh** (Academia Sinica) Reduction-consistency and the Condorcet principle in collective choice probelms	
12:30 - 2:00	*Lunch*				

	Session A: *Pie Cutting*	Session B: *Voting*	Session C: *Social and Political Models*	Session D: *Complexity*	Session E: *IO and Market Games*
2:00 - 2:25	**Michael A. Jones** (Montclair State University) Proportional Pie Cutting	**Leonard Wantchekon** (New York University) Does Ethnic Solidarity Facilitate Electoral Support for Nation-Building Policies?	**Claudia M. Landeo** (University of Alberta) Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes under Court Errors		**Sjaak Hurkens** (UPF) Bayesian Nash equilibrium in "linear" Cournot models with private information about costs
2:30 - 2:55	**Steven Brams** (New York University) Cutting a Pie Is Not a Piece of Cake	**Parikshit Ghosh** (University of British Columbia) Efficient Equilibria and Information Aggregation in Common Interest Voting Games	**Oliver Board** (University of Pittsburgh) Presidential veto power and its consequences for information transmission in the legislative process	**Penelope Hernandez** (University of Alicante) Secret correlation with pure automata	**Yutian Chen** (Stony Brook University) Outsourcing Spurred by Strategic Competition
3:00 - 3:25	**Christian Klamler** (University of Graz) Better ways to cut a cake	**Kfir Eliaz** (New York University) A Decision Theoretic Basis for Choice Shifts in Groups		**Guillaume Lacôte** (Université Paris 6) Boundedly complex Turing strategies play the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: some results	**Bertrand Gobillard** (University Paris 10 Nanterre) Non-Walrasian Equilibria and the Law of One Price: The Wash-Sales Assumption

3:30 - 4:00	*Coffee Break*
3:30 - 4:20	**Abraham Neyman** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Optimal Use of Communication Resources
4:25 - 5:15	**Martin Shubik** (Yale University) On Endogenizing Bureaucracy in a Strategic Market Game
7:00 - 10:00	*Reception Dinner at Three Village Inn*

Wednesday, July 13					
8:30 - 9:15	*Breakfast*				
9:15 - 10:05	**Andrew Postlewaite** (University of Pennsylvania) Aggregation of Expert Opinions				
10:10 - 11:00	**Tristan Tomala** (Université Paris Dauphine) Measuring the value of monitoring in repeated decision problems and in repeated games				
11:00 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*				
	Session A: *Solution Concepts*	Session B: *Cognitive Models*	Session C: *Networks*	Session D: *Cooperative Games*	Session E: *Repeated Games*
11:30 - 11:55	**Attila Ambrus** (Harvard University) Theories of coalitional rationality	**Zhen Liu** (Stony Brook University) Agreement of opinions and trade with unawareness	**Frank H. Page, Jr.** (University of Alabama) Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and Network Formation Games	**Wei-Torng Juang** (Academia Sinica) Learning through Aspiration to Play the Mixed Equilibrium in Zero-Sum Games	**Eduardo Faingold** (Univ of Pennsylvania) Building a Reputation Under Frequent Decisions
12:00 - 12:30	**Stefano Demichelis** (University of Pavia) On use and misuse of topology in game theory	**Giorgos Stamatopoulos** (University of Cyprus) Cognitive hierarchy and two-stage location games	**Amparo Urbano** (University of Valencia) Isolation and redundancy on information dissemination in dynamic networks	**Joachim Rosenmuller** (IMW, University of Bielefeld, Germany) Convex Geometry and Superadditive Solutions	**Ichiro Obara** (University of California Los Angeles) Folk Theorem with Communication
12:30 - 2:00	*Lunch*				
	Session A: *Evolution and Learning*	Session B: *Bounded Rationality*	Session C: *Stochastic Games*	Session D: *Mechanism Design*	Session E: *Pricing*
2:00 - 2:25	**Peter Engseld** (Lund University) Choosing Opponents in Games of Cooperation and Coordination	**Zafer Akin** (Pennsylvania State University) Time Inconsistency And Learning In Bargaining Games	**Eilon Solan** (Tel Aviv University) Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations	**Juergen Bracht** (University of Aberdeen) Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment	**Karl H. Schlag** (European University Institute) Robust Monopoly Pricing - The Case of Regret
2:30 - 2:55	**Sergiu Hart** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium	**Topi Miettinen** (University College London) Agreeing on Play when Players are Prone to Guilt	**Anthony C. Brooms** (Birkbeck College) A stochastic game model for a FCFS queue with load-increasing service rate	**David Wettstein** (Ben-Gurion University) Efficient Bidding with Externalities	**Massimo A. De Francesco** (University of Siena, Italy) Pricing and matching under duopoly with imperfect buyer mobility
3:00 - 3:30	*Coffee Break*				
3:30 - 4:20	**Peyton Young** (Johns Hopkins University) Learning and Equilibrium in Games				
4:25 - 5:15	**Robert John Aumann** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Consciousness				
6:00 - 8:00	*Soccer Game*				

Thursday, July 14					
8:30 - 9:15	*Breakfast*				
9:15 - 10:05	**Philippe Jehiel** (PSE and UCL) Towards a Theory of Deception				
10:10 - 11:00	**Srihari Govindan** (University of Iowa) Some Recent Results on Computing Equilibria				
11:00 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*				
	Session A: *Auctions*	Session B: *Coalition Formation*	Session C: *Equilibrium Computation I*	Session D: *Networks*	Session E: *Social and Political Models*
11:30 - 11:55	**Alexander Matros** (University of Pittsburgh) Contests with Thresholds	**Isa Emin Hafalir** (Penn State University) Stability of Marriage with Externalities	**Andrew G. Gilpin** (Carnegie Mellon University) Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria	**Coralio Ballester** (Universitat Autònoma d Barcelona) Optimal Targets in Peer Networks	**Jamele Rigolini** (University of Warwick) On the Role of Formal and Informal Institutions in Development
12:00 - 12:30	**Andriy Zapechelnyuk** (Stony Brook University) Internet Auctions: Sellers, Bidders, and Auction Houses	**Elena Iñarra** (Basque Country University) Admissible Hierarchic Sets	**Vincent Conitzer** (Carnegie Mellon University) A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It	**Juan Miguel Benito** (Universidad Pública de Navarra) Neighborhood Segregation: Schelling-CA Model	**Anna Rubinchik-Pessach** (University of Colorado at Boulder) Does it Take a Tyrant to Implement a Good Reform?
12:30 - 2:00	*Lunch*				
	Session A: *Cooperative Games*	Session B: *Complexity*	Session C: *Equilibrium Computation II*	Session D: *Industrial Organization*	Session E: *Implementation*
2:00 - 2:25	**Marilda Sotomayor** (Univ. of São Paulo) An Elementary Non-Constructive Proof of the Non-Emptiness of the Core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf	**Daijiro Okada** (Rutgers University) Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall	**Peter Bro Miltersen** (University of Aarhus) Finding Sequential Equilibria Using Lemke's Algorithm	**Elif Incekara** (Pennsylvania State University) Time Inconsistency of Consumers and Excessive Upgrades in the Software Market	**Kurt Annen** (University of Guelph) Lies and Slander: The Implementation of Truth-telling in Repeated Matching Games with Private Monitoring
2:30 - 2:55	**Johannes Rene Van den Brink** (Free University Amsterdam) Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games	**Mark R. Johnson** (Tulane University) A complexity partial order for strategy implementing automata		**Christopher Cotton** (Cornell University) Seller preferences for risk seeking and limited information in an evolutionary price demand game	**Sergio Parreiras** (UNC at Chapel Hill) Smooth Ex-Post Implementation with Multi-Dimensional Information
3:00 - 3:30	*Coffee Break*				
3:30 - 4:20	**Myrna Wooders** (Vanderbilt University and University of Warwick) Market games, inequality and the equal treatment property of the core of a game				
4:25 - 5:15	**Lloyd Shapley** (UCLA) Stable Sets Revisited				

Friday, July 15					
8:30 - 9:15	*Breakfast*				
9:15 - 10:05	**Drew Fudenberg** (Harvard University) Stable Superstitions				
10:10 - 11:00	**Bernhard Von Stengel** (London School of Economics) Geometry of Nash equilibria for two-player games				
11:00 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*				
	Session A: *Mechanisms and the Chinese Postman*	Session B: *Applications*	Session C: *Equilibrium Computation III*	Session D: *Information Transmission*	Session E: *Cooperative Games*
11:30 - 11:55	**Michael Maschler** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Recent results concerning the core and the nucleolus on a class of the Chinese Postman game	**Timothy Mathews** (California State University - Northridge) Participation Incentives in Rank Order Tournaments with Endogenous Entry	**Gabriel Darren Rosenberg** (London School of Economics) Computation of Nash Equilibria for Bimatrix Games with Integer Pivoting	**Frederic Koessler** (Universite de Cergy-Pontoise) Long Persuasion in Sender-Receiver Games	**Marco Scarsini** (Universita di Torino) Large Newsvendor Games
12:00 - 12:30	**Thomas Gresik** (University of Notre Dame) The Economics of Yardstick Regulations without External Benchmarks	**Andrey Garnaev** (Saint Petersburg State University) The Kuhn-Tucker Theorem and Resource Allocation Games	**Rahul Savani** (London School of Economics) Challenge Games for Computing a Nash Equilibrium	**Dragan Filipovich** (El Colegio de Mexico) Cheap Talk on the Circle	**Debasis Mishra** (Universite Catholique de Louvain) Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem
12:30 - 2:00	*Lunch*				
3:30 - 4:20	**David G. Pearce** (New York University) Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures				
4:25 - 5:15	**John Nash** (Princeton University) Results from Studies on the Reduction of Cooperative Games to Non-Cooperative Form (Using the Agencies Method) and Project Plans for Further Study				