Simplicity and Robustness in Complex Markets

Stony Brook Workshop July 11 - 12, 2019

Organizers: Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier

Schedule of Talks

Thursday July 11

9:15 - 9:30	Opening Remarks
9:30 - 10:10	Eva Tardos (Cornell University)
10:10 - 10:40	Coffee Break
10:40 - 11:20	Chiara Farronato (Harvard Business School) "Consumer Protection in an Online World: An Analysis of Occupational Licensing"
11:20 - 12:00	Amin Saberi (Stanford University) "Matching and Pricing in Ride Sharing"
12:00 - 2:00	Lunch Break
2:00 - 2:40	Dirk Bergemann (Yale University) "Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model"
2:40 - 3:20	Scott Kominers (Harvard Business School) "On Incentives in Large Markets"
3:20 - 3:50	Coffee Break
3:50 - 4:30	Matt Weinberg (Princeton University) "Quantitative Tradeoffs in Simplicity Versus Optimality in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design"
4:30 - 5:10	Brendan Lucier (Microsoft) "Mechanism Design for ROI-Minded Agents"
6:30	Dinner

Friday July 12

9:30 - 10:10	Tim Roughgarden (Columbia University) "Simple versus Optimal Contracts"
10:10 - 10:40	Coffee Break
10:40 - 11:20	Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University) "Auction Design under Interdependent Values"
11:20 - 12:00	Richard Cole (New York University) "Balancing Robustness and Convergence of Tatonnement"
12:00 - 2:00	Lunch Break
2:00 - 2:40	Vahideh Manshadi (Yale School of Management) "Online Resource Allocation Under Partially Predictable Demand"
2:40 - 3:20	Shuchi Chawla (University of Wisconsin - Madison) "Buy-Many Mechanisms are Not Much Better than Item Pricing"
3:20 - 3:50	Coffee Break
3:50 - 4:30	Irene Lo (Stanford University) "Facilitating Student Information Acquisition in Matching Markets"
4:30 - 5:10	Sergiu Hart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) "Selling Multiple Goods: The Better Half and the Multiple of Basic Revenue"
5:10	Adjourn