International Conference on Game Theory

Charles B. Wang Center, Stony Brook University

July 15 - 19, 2019

	Monday, July 15					
	Theater	*LH1*		*LH2*		
9:30 - 10:15	**Gabriel Carroll** (Stanford University) *Information Games and Robust Trading Mechanisms*	**Scott Kominers** (Harvard University) *Redistribution Through Markets*		**Yann Bramoullé** (Aix-Marseille University) *Informal Transfers in Networks*		
10:15 - 11:00	**Tim Roughgarden** (Stanford University) *Data-Driven Optimal Auction Theory*	**Assaf Romm** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) *The Law of One Price for Heterogeneous Goods*		**Sushil Bikhchandani** (University of California, Los Angeles) *Intermediated Surge Pricing*		
11:00 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*					
	Theater: Refinement & Rationality	*LH1: Networks*	*LH2: Dynamic Games*	*Chapel: Mechanism Design*	*101: Auctions*	*102: Contracts*	*201: Fairness*

	Theater: Refinement & Rationality	*LH1: Networks*	*LH2: Dynamic Games*	*Chapel: Mechanism Design*	*101: Auctions*	*102: Contracts*	*201: Fairness*
11:30 - 11:50	**Łukasz Balbus** (University of Zielona Góra) *Interim Correlated Rationalizability in Large Games*	**Wayne Yuan Gao** (University of Pennsylvania) *Informal Risk Sharing with Local Information*	**Isaias Chaves** (Northwestern University, Kellogg) *Privacy in Bargaining: The Case of Endogenous Entry*	**Tao Zhang** (New York University) *On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design with Exit Option in a Markovian Environment*	**Soham Banerjee** (International Institute of Information Technology, Pune) *Resolving Deadlocks using All-Pay Auctions*	**Francesc Dilme** (University of Bonn) *Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings*	**Alexander Matros** (University of South Carolina) *Fair and Square Contests*
11:50 - 12:10	**Tarun Sabarwal** (University of Kansas) *Monotone Global Games*	**Ming Li** (Yale University) *Logical Differencing in Network Formation Models under Non-Transferable Utilities*	**Andrew McClellan** (University of Chicago Booth School of Business) *Dynamic Project Standards with Adverse Selection*	**Ali Kamranzadeh** (University of Western Ontario) *Fairness versus Favoritism in Conflict Mediation*	**Idione Meneghel** (Australian National University) *On the existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games without complementarities*	**Matthias Fahn** (JKU Linz) *The Norm of Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships*	**Anay Mehrotra** (Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur) *Toward Controlling Discrimination in Online Ad Auctions*
12:10 - 12:30	**Asha Sadanand** (University of Guelph) *Selten's Horse: an Experiment on Sequential Rationality*	**Yiqing Xing** (Johns Hopkins University) *A Theory of Multiplexity: Sustaining Cooperation with Multiple Relationships*	**Hyunjae Kang** (Stony Brook University) *Dynamic Tournament Model of Private Tutoring Expenditure*	**Mingshi Kang** (UWO) *Knitting and Ironing: Reducing Inequalities via Auctions*	**Pulkit Kumar Nigam** (University of South Carolina) *Asymmetric Contests and the Effects of a Cap on Bids*	**Aniko Oery** (Yale) *Aiming for the goal: contribution dynamics of crowdfunding*	**Hendrik Rommeswinkel** (National Taiwan University) *Measuring Freedom in Games*

	Lunch Break		
12:30 - 14:00	*Lunch Break*		
	Theater	*LH1*	*LH2*
14:00 - 14:45	**Andrew Postlewaite** (University of Pennsylvania) *A Very Robust Auction Mechanism*	**Marina Halac** (Yale University) *Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors*	**Qingmin Liu** (Columbia University) *Stability and Belief Consistency of Matching with Incomplete Information*
14:45 - 15:15	*Coffee Break*		

	Theater: Cooperative games & Related Topics	LH1: Dynamic Mechanism Design	LH2: Dynamic Games	Chapel: Mechanism Design	101: Auctions	102: Contracts	201: Incomplete Information
15:15 - 15:35	**José Manuel Zarzuelo** (The Basque Country University) *Two solutions for bargaining problems with claims*	**Nima Haghpanah** (Penn State University) *Sequential Mechanisms With ex post Participation Guarantees*	**Sara Shahanaghi** (Columbia University) *A Dynamic Model of Reputation-Driven Media Bias*	**Jingfeng Lu** (National University of Singapore) *Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Buyer Price Search*	**Jinsoo Bae** (The Ohio State University) *Selling shares to many budget constrained bidders: Theory and Experiment*	**Luis Alvaro Cuba Horna** (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú) *Interactive Epistemology Applied to Drafting Contracts. The Partial Death of Filling The Contractual Gaps*	**James Best** (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie mellon university) *Persuasion for the Long Run*
15:35 - 15:55	**Dario Paccagnan** (University of California, Santa Barbara) *Computing Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games*	**Ilia Krasikov** (Pennsylvania State University) *On Dynamic Pricing*	**Lukasz Patryk Wozny** (Warsaw School of Economics) *Distributional equilibria in dynamic supermodular games with a measure space of players and no aggregate risk*	**Jeffrey Mensch** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) *Screening Inattentive Agents*	**Gagan Pratap Ghosh** (California State University Fullerton) *Sequential Auctions with Ambiguity*	**Pablo Cuellar Tapia** (Boston University) *Venture Capital Contracts under Disagreement*	**Daniel Quigley** (University of Oxford) *Contradiction-Proof Information Design*
15:55 - 16:15	**Rajeev Ranjan Tripathi** (Indian Institute of Management Bangalore) *Fair Pricing in a Two-sided Market Game*	**Niccolo Lomys** (Toulouse School of Economics) *Learning while Trading: Experimentation and Coasean Dynamics*	**Chang Zhao** (Tel Aviv University) *Information as Regulation*	**Amnon Schreiber** (Bar Ilan University, Israel) *Voluntary Disclosure of Bad News in a Dynamic Model*	**Feng Zhu** (the Pennsylvania State University) *Creative Contests --- Theory and Experiment*	**Jihwan Do** (University of Rochester) *Incentives in Equal-Pay-for-Equal-Work Principle*	**Denis Shishkin** (Princeton University) *Persuasion via Weak Institutions*
16:15 - 16:35		**Daniel Garrett** (Toulouse School of Economics) *Robust Predictions in Dynamic Screening*	**Beixi Zhou** (Boston University) *Dynamic Coordination with Informational Externalities*			**Nan Zhao** (Boston University) *Optimal Contracts with Learning from Bad News*	**Archishman Chakraborty** (Yeshiva University) *Subversive Conversations*
16:35 - 17:00	*Coffee Break*						
17:00 - 17:45	**Eric Maskin** (Harvard University) *Elections and Strategic Voting: Condorcet and Borda*						

Tuesday, July 16

	Theater	LH1	LH2
9:30 - 10:15	**Michihiro Kandori** (University of Tokyo) *Misperception and the Evolution of Cooperation*	**Mehmet Ekmekci** (Boston College) *Informal Elections With Dispersed Information*	**Eric Budish** (University of Chicago) *Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation*
10:15 - 11:00	**Jeffrey Ely** (Northwestern University) *Feedback Design in Dynamic Contests*	**Itai Ashlagi** (Stanford University) *Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations*	**Satoru Takahashi** (National University of Singapore) *Optimal Stress Tests: Information Design with Adversarial Equilibrium Selection in Supermodular Games*

11:00 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*					
	Theater: Implementation	LH1: Networks	LH2: Matching	Chapel: Mechanism Design	101: Knowledge & Information	102: Experimental Economics
11:30 - 11:50	**Chun-Ting Chen** (National Taiwan University) *Correlation with Forwarding*	**David Rahman** (University of Minnesota) *Contractual Pricing with Incentive Constraints*	**Marilda Sotomayor** (EPGE-FGV & USP-SP, Brazil) *Conflict-free and Pareto-optimal allocations in matching markets: A solution concept weaker than the core*	**Andres Perlroth** (Stanford University) *Revenue maximization with heterogeneous discounting: Auctions and pricing*	**Dean Jens** (University of Central Florida) *Risk Dominance, Beliefs, and Equilibrium*	**Jordan Adamson** (Chapman University) *Agglomeration and the Extent of the Market*
11:50 - 12:10	**Huiyi Guo** (Texas A&M University) *Coalition-Proof Mechanisms Under Correlated Information*	**Tridib Sharma** (ITAM) *Sequential Expert Advice: Superiority of Closed Door Meetings.*	**Kentaro Tomoeda** (University of Technology Sydney) *Sophistication and Cautiousness in College Applications*	**Ady Pauzner** (Tel Aviv University) *Bilateral Trade With a Benevolent Intermediary*	**Rohit Parikh** (City University of New York) *To What Extent is a Group an Individual?*	**Paul J Healy** (The Ohio State University) *Epistemic Experiments: Utilities, Beliefs, and Irrational Play*
12:10 - 12:30	**Xuesong Huang** (Rutgers University) *Incentive Compatible Self-fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations*	**Isaac Swift** (University of Minnesota) *Reputation for Persuasion*	**Akhil Vohra** (Stanford University) *Unraveling in the Presence of a Secondary Market*	**Mihai Manea** (Stony Brook University) *Resource Destruction in Optimal Mechanisms for Bilateral Trade*	**Peio Zuazo-Garin** (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) *Rationalizability, Observability and Common Knowledge*	**Rene Levinsky** (Economics Institute of the Czech Academy od Sciences) *Preferences, Beliefs, and Strategic Plays in Games*

12:30 - 14:00	*Lunch Break*		
	Theater	LH1	LH2
14:00 - 14:45	**Dilip Abreu** (New York University) *Equilibrium selection in Repeated Games with Patient Players*	**Ran Shorrer** (Penn State University) *Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes*	**Ehud Kalai** (Northwestern University) *Viable Nash Equilibria*
14:45 - 15:15	*Coffee Break*		

	Theater: Matching & Cooperative Games	LH1: Bias & Polarization in Opinion Formation	LH2: Dynamic Games & Reputations	Chapel: Mechanism Design	101: Bounded Rationality & Computation	102: Experimental Economics	201: Incomplete Information
15:15 - 15:35	**Satoshi Masuya** (Daito Bunka University) *The Shapley Value of the Lower Game for Partially Defined Cooperative Games*	**Krishna Dasaratha** (Harvard University) *Belief Polarization and News on Social Media*	**Daniel Clark** (MIT) *Robust Cooperation with First-Order Information*	**Shurojit Chatterji** (Singapore Management University) *Probabilistic Generalized Median Voter Schemes: A Robust Characterization*	**Mengke Wang** (Duke University, University of Sydney) *Self-Similar Beliefs in Games with Strategic Substitutes*	**Kirby Nielsen** (Stanford University) *A Systematic Test of the Independence Axiom*	**Siyu Ma** (Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya) *Attacking a nuclear facility with a noisy intelligence and Bayesian agents*
15:35 - 15:55	**T.E.S. Raghaven** (University of Illinois at Chicago) *Measuring the power of the dominant partner among married couple*	**Rahmi Ilkilic** (Universidad de Chile) *Opinion Polarization under Search for Peers*	**Mehmet Ekmekci** (Boston College) *Reputation and Screening in a Noisy Environment with Irreversible Actions*	**Arthur Dolgopolov** (George Mason University) *Mechanism Design with Memory and no Money*	**Sakshi Upadhyay** (Virginia Polytechnic Institute) *To Join or not to Join: Coalition Formation in Public Good Games*	**Chloe Tergiman** (PSU) *Preferences for Power*	**Yuehui Wang** (University of California San Diego) *Cheaper Talk*
15:55 - 16:15	**Isa Hafalir** (UTS) *Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment*	**Suraj Malladi** (Stanford University) *Learning Through the Grapevine: The Impact of Message Mutation, Transmission Failure, and Deliberate Bias*	**Harry Pei** (Northwestern University) *Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment*	**Eiichiro Kazumori** (The University of Massachusetts) *Games Where Players Offers Games to Play: A Foundation of Market Design*	**Bahman Kalantari** (Rutgers University) *Approximating Nash Equilibrium Via Multilinear Minimax*	**Qichao Shi** (Lehigh University) *Shuffling as a Sales Tactics: An Experimental Study of Selling Expert Advice*	**Wenhao Wu** (University of Arizona) *Persuasive Disclosure*
16:15 - 16:35	**Aram Grigoryan** (Duke University) *Efficient and Envy Minimal Assignment*	**Pooya Molavi** (MIT) *Media Capture: A Bayesian Persuasion Perspective*	**Jian Sun** (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) *Reputation Concerns Under At-Will Employment*	**Andrew Mackenzie** (Maastricht University) *Strategy-proofness and perfect mechanisms*	**Chun Leung Lau** (Rutgers University) *The Multilinear Minimax Relaxation of Bimatrix Games and Comparison with Nash Equilibria via Lemke-Howson*		**Yoshifumi Yokota** (Boston University) *Preference, Rationalizability and Robustness in Games with Incomplete Information*
16:35 - 17:00	*Coffee Break*						
17:00 - 17:45	**Al Roth** (Stanford University) *Market Design and Game Theory in a Large World*						
18:00 - 22:00	**Conference Dinner at** *Three Village Inn*						

			Wednesday, July 17			

	Theater		LH1		LH2	
9:30 - 10:15	**Matthew Jackson** (Stanford University) *Network Structure, Coordination Games, and Behavioral Communities*		**Jacob Leshno** (University of Chicago) *An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System*		**Annie Liang** (University of Pennsylvania) *Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information*	
10:15 - 10:45	*Coffee Break*					

	Theater: Repeated Games	LH1: Networks	LH2: Matching	Chapel: Knowledge & Information	101: Market Games	102: Industrial Organization & Finance	
10:45 - 11:05	**Zirou Chen** (University of Rochester) *Middlemen and Reputation*	**Krishna Dasaratha** (Harvard University) *Social Learning and Innovation*	**Kartik Ahuja** (UCLA) *Dynamic Matching and Allocation of Tasks*	**Wioletta Dziuda** (University of Chicago) *Communication with Detectable Deceit*	**Heinrich Harald Nax** (ETH Zurich) *Feedback effects in the experimental double auction with private information*	**Dana María Pizarro** (Universidad de Chile) *Bounding the Value of Observability in a Dynamic Pricing Problem*	
11:05 - 11:25	**Xin Gao** (University of Mannheim) *Reputational Cheap Talk vs. Reputational Delegation*	**Ben Golub** (Harvard University) *Targeting Interventions in Networks*	**Ahmet Altinok** (Arizona State University) *May-to-One Dynamic Matching*	**Ziv Hellman** (Bar Ilan University) *Valuing Information by Repeated Signals*	**Yan Wang** (Stony Brook University) *How the market structure affects the r&d decision when acquisition is possible?*	**Ayan Bhattacharya** (City University of New York, Baruch College) *Hardness of Learning in Rich Environments and Some Consequences for Financial Markets*	
11:25 - 11:45		**Pellumb Reshidi** (Princeton University) *Sequencing Naive Social Learning*	**Deniz Dizdar** (University of Montreal) *Competing Pre-match Investments Revisited: A Precise Characterization of the Limits of Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Large Markets*	**Kohei Iwasaki** (University of Wisconsin-Madison) *Rational Bubbles and Middlemen*	**Weiwei Zheng** (George Mason University) *Competition with Indivisibilities and Few Traders*	**Sang-Ha Yoon** (Stony brook University) *Firm Entry Decline, Market Structure and Dominant Firm's Productivity*	
11:45 - 13:15	*Lunch Break*						

	Theater		LH1		LH2	
13:15 - 14:00	**Drew Fudenberg** (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) *Player Compatible Equilibrium*		**Abraham Neyman** (Hebrew University) *Optimization with Limited Memory in Stochastic Games*		**Rakesh Vohra** (Northwestern University) *Instability of Centralized Markets*	

	Theater: Applications	LH1: Networks	LH2: Finance	Chapel: Mechanism Design	101: Learning & Evolution	102: Information Economics	
14:00 - 14:20	**Xingwei Hu** (IMF) *College Ranking by Revealed Preference From Big Data: An Authority-Distribution Analysis*	**Anastas Tenev** (Maastricht University) *Stronger bonds with less connected agents in stable resource sharing networks*	**Martin Szydlowski** (University of Minnesota) *Monitor Reputation and Transparency*	**Yangwei Song** (Humboldt University Berlin) *Efficient Design With Small Informational Size and Maxmin Agents*	**Kimberly Gannon** (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) *An Evolutionary Justification for Overconfidence*	**Nasimeh Heydaribeni** (University of Michigan) *Characterizing non-myopic information cascades in Bayesian learning*	

Time	Theater: Voting & Political Models	LH1: Sharing in Networks	LH2: Matching	Chapel: Mechanism Design	101: Learning & Evolution	102: Information Economics	201: Bargaining
14:20 - 14:40	**Brian Reed Powers** (Arizona State University) *N-Player Final-Offer Arbitration: Harmonic Numbers in Equilibrium*	**Wenji Xu** (The University of Chicago) *Social Learning under Information Control*	**Zafer Kanik** (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) *Can Rescues by Banks Replace Costly Bail-Outs in Financial Networks?*	**Constantine Sorokin** (Glasgow University) *Adverse implementation*	**Tatiana Mayskaya** (Higher School of Economics) *When Should We Care About Privacy? Information Collection in Games*	**Svetlana Boyarchenko** (University of Texas, Austin) *Strategic exit with information and payoff externalities*	
14:40 - 15:00		**Manuel Foerster** (University of Hamburg) *Shadow links*	**Hanzhe Zhang** (Michigan State University) *Overcoming Borrowing Stigma: The Design of Lending-of-Last-Resort Policies*		**Wojciech Olszewski** (Northwestern University) *A result on convergence of sequences of iteration, with applications to best-response dynamics*	**Vasudha Jain** (University of Texas at Austin) *Competing to persuade a rationally inattentive agent*	
15:00 - 15:30	Coffee Break						
	Theater: Voting & Political Models	LH1: Sharing in Networks	LH2: Matching	Chapel: Mechanism Design	101: Learning & Evolution	102: Information Economics	201: Bargaining
15:30 - 15:50	**Steven Brams** (New York University) *The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes*	**Lining Han** (Wuhan University) *Truthful Intermediation with Monetary Punishment*	**Maciej H. Kotowski** (Harvard University) *A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems*	**Qinggong Wu** (Chinese University of Hong Kong) *Getting Information from Your Enemies*	**Tao Wang** (Nanjing Audit University) *Strong Stochastic Dominance*	**Daniel Monte** (Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV) *Information Design with Recommender Systems*	**Heng Liu** (University of Michigan) *Robust Predictions in Bargaining with Incomplete Information*
15:50 - 16:10	**Marie Thea How Choon** (Boston University) *Very Biased Political Experts: Cheap Talk, Persuasion and the Political Extremes*	**Ruben Juarez** (University of Hawaii) *Incentive-Compatible Simple Mechanisms*	**Andy Luchuan Liu** (South University of science & technology) *Multipartite Games And Evolutionary Stable Matching*	**Renkun Yang** (Ohio State University) *Termination fee as a sequential screening device*	**Yijia Wang** (Peking University) *Strategy Space Collapse: Experiment and Theory*	**Erik Lillethun** (Colgate University) *Optimal Information Design for Reputation Building*	**Jack Anthony Fanning** (Brown University) *Bargaining over Contingent Contracts Under Incomplete Information*
16:10 - 16:30	**Guillermo Flores** (Universidad del Pacífico) *Game Theory and the Law: Legal Rationality (Legal Interpretation)*	**Juan D. Moreno-Ternero** (Universidad Pablo de Olavide) *Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies*	**Ali Polat** (Carnegie Mellon University) *Accommodating Cardinal, Ordinal and Mixed Preferences: An Extended Preference Domain for the Assignment Problem*	**Seung Han Yoo** (Korea University) *Membership Mechanism*	**Jiabin Wu** (University of Oregon) *Intergenerational Transmission of Preferences and the Marriage Market*	**Nikolaus Robalino** (Rochester Institute of Technology) *Selling Reputational Information*	**Dominik Karos** (Maastricht University) *The Midpoint Constrained Egalitarian Bargaining Solution*
16:30 - 16:50	**Dinko Dimitrov** (Saarland University) *Probabilistic manipulation of sequential voting procedures*	**Miguel Vargas** (Santigo de Cali University) *Robust Equilibria in Tournaments with Externalities*	**Simon Mauras** (Université Paris Diderot, IRIF) *Incentives in Popularity-based Random Matching Markets*	**Mark Whitmeyer** (University of Texas at Austin) *Bayesian Elicitation*	**Zibo Xu** (Singapore University of Technology and Design) *Convergence of the Best-response Dynamic in Potential Games*	**Alexander Rodivilov** (School of Business, Stevens Institute of Technology) *Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production*	**Kirill Evdokimov** (Rice University) *Legislative bargaining with coalition and proposer-dependent surplus*
16:50 - 17:15	Coffee Break						

	Theater	LH1	LH2
17:15 - 18:00	**Larry Samuelson** (Yale University) *Model-Based Inference*	**Itay Fainmesser** (John Hopkins University) *The Market for Online Influence*	**Erik Madsen** (New York University) *Leaks, Sabotage, and Information Design*

	Theater	LH1	LH2
	Larry Samuelson (Yale University) *Model-Based Inference*	**Itay Fainmesser** (John Hopkins University) *The Market for Online Influence*	**Erik Madsen** (New York University) *Leaks, Sabotage, and Information Design*

Thursday, July 18

	Theater	LH1			LH2	
9:30 - 10:15	**Peyton Young** (LSE and University of Oxford) *The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks*	**Juan Escobar** (University of Chile) *Delegating Learning*			**Bryony Reich** (Northwestern University) *Coordination, Communication Networks, and Modular Organization*	
10:15 - 10:45	*Coffee Break*					

	Theater: Finance	LH1: Networks	LH2: Matching & Search	Chapel: Dynamic Games	101: Political Economy	102: Incomplete Information	201: Industrial Organization
10:45 - 11:05	**Michael Gofman** (University of Rochester) *Interbank Trading, Collusion, and Financial Regulation*	**George Charlson** (University of Oxford) *Price Competition in Buyer-Seller Networks*	**Congyi Zhou** (New York University) *Early Selections and Affirmative Actions in the High School Admission Reform in China*	**Yanling Chang** (Texas A&M University) *Worst-Case Analysis for a Leader-follower Partially Observable Stochastic Game*	**Christopher M Li** (Cowles Foundation) *Dynamic Obstruction*	**Deepal Basak** (Indian School of Business) *Timely Persuasion*	**Benjamin Casner** (The Ohio State University) *Seller Curation in Platforms*
11:05 - 11:25	**Kebin Ma** (University of Warwick) *Banking Competition and Stability: The Role of Leverage*	**Ezra Einy** *Strong Robustness to Incomplete Information and The Uniqueness of Correlated Equuilibrium*	**Naomi M Utgoff** (United States Naval Academy) *What's Love Got To Do With It? Random Search, Optimal Stopping, and Stable Marriage*	**Yen-Lin Chiu** (Johns Hopkins University) *Competitive Equilibrium Fraud in Markets for Credence-Goods*	**Yiqing Xing** (Johns Hopkins University) *Communication with Informal Funding*	**Costas Cavounidis** (University of Warwick) *When Does Information Determine Market Size? Search and Rational Inattention*	**Daniel Habermacher** (University of Warwick) *Authority and Information Acquisition in Cheap Talk with Informational Interdependence*
11:25 - 11:45	**Fenghua Song** (Penn State University) *Ethics and Talent in Banking*	**Toomas Hinnosaar** (Collegio Carlo Alberto) *Price Setting on a Network*	**Hanzhe Zhang** (Michigan State University) *Pre-Matching Gambles*			**Mayuri Chaturvedi** (Columbia University) *A model of rent seeking and inequality*	**Shota Ichihashi** (Bank of Canada) *Non-Competing Data Intermediaries*
11:45 - 13:15	*Lunch Break*						

	Theater	LH1			LH2	
13:15 - 14:00	**Sergiu Hart** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) *An Integral Approach to Calibration*	**Joel Watson** (University of California, San Diego) *Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement*			**Olivier Gossner** (CNRS- Ecole Polytechnique Paris) *Attention, please!*	

	Theater: Solution Concepts	LH1: Networks	LH2: Matching	Chapel: Stochastic Games	101: Finance	102: Incomplete Information	201: Industrial Organization
14:00 - 14:20	**Eugene Feinberg** (Stony Brook University) *Solutions for Zero-Sum Two-Player Games with Noncompact Decision Sets*	**Shaofei Jiang** (The University of Texas at Austin) *Disclosure of Sequential Evidence*	**Jaimie W. Lien** (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) *Strategic Post-exam Preference Submission in the School Choice Game*	**Georgy Lukyanov** (École Polytechnique) *Reputation and Social Learning*	**Ragnar Juelsrud** (Norges Bank) *Dividend Payouts and Rollover Crises*	**Wolfgang Kuhle** (University of Economics Prague) *Observing Actions in Bayesian Games*	**Jidong Zhou** (Yale University) *Information Structure and Price Competition*

Time							
14:20 - 14:40	**John Hillas** (University of Auckland) *Strategic Games from an Observer's Perspective*	**Sunjin Kim** (Virginia Tech) *Equilibrium configurations in the heterogeneous model of signed network formation*	**Zeky Ahmed Murra Anton** (Brown University) *Determinants of the College Early Admissions Market Configuration*	**Miquel Oliu-Barton** (University Paris Dauphine) *A solution for stochastic games*	**Caio Machado** (PUC Chile) *Optimal investment and capital structure under feedback effects*	**Emilien Macault** (HEC Paris) *Learning in Repeated Routing Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information*	**Amparo Urbano** (University of Valencia) *Demand for Privacy, selling consumer information, and consumer hiding vs. opt-out.*
14:40 - 15:00	**Frank Huettner** (ESMT Berlin) *Marginality, dividends, and the value in games with externalities*	**Fen LI** (Bielefeld University; University of Paris 1) *Anti-conformism in the threshold model of collective behavior*	**Xingye Wu** (Tsinghua University) *College Admission with Flexible Major Quotas*	**Deepanshu Vasal** (University of Texas, Austin) *Signaling in mean-field games*	**Juan Passadore** (EIEF) *Robust Predictions in Dynamic Policy Games*		
15:00 - 15:30	*Coffee Break*						
	Theater: Solution Concepts	*LH1: Networks*	*LH2: Information*	*Chapel: Industrial Organization*	*101: Implementation*	*102: Incomplete Information*	
15:30 - 15:50	**Mehmet Ismail** (King's College London) *One for all, all for one–von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto*	**Kota Murayama** (Northwestern University) *Social Value of Information in Networked Economies*	**Zhonghong Kuang** (Tsinghua University) *Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion*	**Vladyslav Nora** (Nazarbayev University) *Harmful Screening in Competitive Markets*	**Ritesh Jain** (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica) *Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms:Complete information*	**Ludmila Matyskova** (University of Bonn) *Bayesian Persuasion With Costly Information Acquisition*	
15:50 - 16:10	**Xiang Sun** (Wuhan University) *Perfect and proper equilibria in large games*	**Norma Olaizola** (University of the Basque Country) *Characterization of efficient networks in a connections model with decreasing returns technology*	**Jian Li** (McGill University) *Comparative Statics of Product Disclosure Statements*	**Sougata Poddar** (Argyros School of Business and Economics & Chapman University) *Innovation, Diffusion and Shelving*	**Takashi Kunimoto** (Singapore Management University) *Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima*	**Paul Muench** (US Army) *Noisy and Silent Games of Timing with Detection Uncertainty and Numerical Estimates*	
16:10 - 16:30	**Joel Watson** (University of California, San Diego) *Plain Consistency and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium*	**Mohammad T. Irfan** (Bowdoin College) *The Power of Context in Game-Theoretic Models of Networks: Ideal Point Models with Social Interactions*	**Hangcheng Zhao** (The University of Chicago) *Perception Bias in Tullock Contest*	**Salah Salimian** (Urmia University) *Locating the Sale Agents in Spoke Model through Uniform Distribution of Consumers*	**Cheng-Kuang Wu** (School of Computer Science and Software, Zhaoqing University, China) *A Game Theory Approach for Evaluating and Assigning Suppliers in Supply Chain Management*	**Rafael Veiel** (Ecole Polytechnique) *Complexity of Strategic Thinking and Robustness of Interim Rationalizability*	
16:30 - 16:50		**Fanqi Shi** (Peking University) *Screening with Network Externalities*	**Jie Zheng** (Tsinghua University) *Information Design in Simultaneous All-pay Auction Contests*		**Shuo Xu** (The Ohio State University) *(Cost-of-) Information Design*	**Takashi Ui** (Hitotsubashi University) *LQG Information Design*	
16:50 - 17:15	*Coffee Break*						
	Theater	*LH1*			*LH2*		
17:15 - 18:00	**Alessandro Pavan** (Northwestern University) *Searching for Arms*	**Navin Kartik** (Columbia University) *A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications to Communication Games*			**Yash Kanoria** (Columbia University) *Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms*		

	Friday, July 19						
	Theater: Networks	LH1: Persuasion	LH2: Cooperation & Convention	Chapel: Voting	101: Learning & Information Design	102: Information & Institutions	201: Persuasion & Bounded Rationality
9:30 - 9:50	**Tim Russo** (National Defense University) *Future Combat Air System Pricing*	**Jonas Hedlund** (University of Texas at Dallas) *Signaling through Bayesian persuasion*	**Yu Awaya** (University of Rochester) *Collusion under persistent shocks*	**Rune Midjord** (Copenhagen Business School) *Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting*	**Yujie Qian** (Yale University) *Persuasion through a strategic moderator*	**Valeria Burdea** (University of Pittsburgh) *Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment*	**Gabriel Alberto Martinez** (University of Wisconsin-Madison) *Bayesian Persuasion with Hidden Motives*
9:50 - 10:10	**Marco Scarsini** (LUISS) *The buck-passing game*	**Toygar Tayyar Kerman** (Maastricht University) *Persuading Voters With Private Communication Strategies*	**Ce Liu** (Michigan State University) *Convention and Coalitions in Repeated Games*	**Joseph McMurray** (Brigham Young University) *Polarization and Pandering in Common Interest Elections*	**Yu Fu Wong** (Columbia University) *Strategic Exploration*	**German Gieczewski** (Princeton University) *Wars of Attrition with Evolving States*	**Miklos Pinter** (BME) *Objective ambiguity*
10:10 - 10:30	**Cole Randall Williams** (University of Vienna) *Echo Chambers: Social Learning under Unobserved Heterogeneity*	**Todd Stambaugh** (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy) *Lying and Lie-Detection in Bayesian Persuasion Games with Costs and Punishments*	**Nathan Yoder** (University of Georgia) *Matching with Complementary Contracts*	**Svetlana Kosterina** (Princeton university) *Information Structures and Information Aggregation in Threshold Equilibria in Elections*	**Kai Hao Yang** (University of Chicago) *Implications of Consumer Data Monopoly*	**Andrew Kosenko** (University of Pittsburgh) *Mediated Persuasion*	**Adam Dominiak** (Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University) *Common Belief in Choquet Rationality with an ``Attitude''*
10:30 - 10:50				**Carl Heese** (University Bonn) *Large Elections with Endogenous Information*	**Weijie Zhong** (Stanford University) *Time preference and information acquisition*	**Richard Van Weelden** (University of Pittsburgh) *Delegation in Veto Bargaining*	
10:50 - 11:20	*Coffee Break*						
	Theater	LH1		LH2			
11:20 - 12:05	**Stephen Morris** (Princeton University) *Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice*	**Vijay Krishna** (Penn State University) *Disadvantageous Information*		**Shmuel Zamir** (Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) *Strategic use of seller information in private-value first-price auctions*			
	Adjourn						