

International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 20 - 24, 2015

Schedule of Talks

Monday, July 20						
9:00 - 9:45	Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University) Long-Range Planning with Time-Inconsistency					
9:45 - 10:15	Coffee Break					
	LH1: Computation	101: Learning and Evolution	102: Information and Networks	201: Industrial Organization	301: Repeated Games	LH2: Dynamic Games
10:15 - 10:45	Hau Chan (Stony Brook University) Learning Game Parameters from MSNE: An Application to Learning IDS Games	Ziv Hellman (Bar Ilan University) Sex and Portfolio Investment	Liad Blumrosen (Hebrew U) Networks of Complements	Barna Bako (MTA TKI) Strategic segmentation: creating monopolies can increase welfare	Siddharth Pal (University of Maryland) A simple learning rule with monitoring leading to Nash Equilibrium under delays	Chiara Margaria (Yale University) Dynamic Coordination and Learning
10:45 - 11:15	Shikha Singh (Stony Brook University) Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers	Jean Paul Rabanal (Bates College) A simulation on the evolution of markets: Call Market, Decentralized and Posted Offer	Gaëtan Fournier (Paris 1) Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria	Gaurab Aryal (University of Chicago) Empirical Contest Models	Zhijian Wang (Zhejiang University) The social cycling in Fixed-Paired Matching Pennies Game	Marco Scarsini (LUISS) Atomic Dynamic Network Games
11:15 - 11:45	Richard E Stearns (University at Albany) Realization Plans for Extensive Form Games without Perfect Recall	Karen Khachatryan Cancelled		Yong Chao (University of Louisville) Nonlinear Pricing with Asymmetric Competition In the Absence of Private Information		
11:45 - 13:30	Lunch Break					

13:30 - 14:15	Costis Daskalakis (MIT) Auctions defying intuition						
14:15 - 14:45	Coffee Break						
	LH1: Finance	101: Auctions	102: Mechanism Design	201: Industrial Organization	301: Contracts	LH2: Social and Political Models	Chapel: Experimental Economics
14:45 - 15:15	Abhinav Anand (University College Dublin) Foster-Hart Risk and the Too-big-to-Fail Banks	Yangguang Huang (University of Washington) Hybrid Mechanism: Theory, Practice and Empirical Analysis	Esat Doruk Cetemen (University of Rochester) Dynamic Revenue Maximization on a Network	Jooyong Jun (Bank of Korea) Entry of non-financial firm and competition in the retail payments market	Alex Smolin (Yale University) Optimal Feedback and Wage Policies	Jacopo Perego (New York University) Media Competition and the Source of Disagreement	Penélope Hernández (Valencia University- ERI-CES) Words and actions as communication devices
15:15 - 15:45	Matthias Leiss (ETHZ - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) The Option-Implied Foster-Hart Riskiness	Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen (London School of Economics) Spying in Contests	Philip N. Brown (The University of Colorado at Boulder) Optimal Mechanisms for Robust Coordination in Congestion Games	Filomena García (Indiana University and ISEG/UECE) Strategic Complementarities and substitutabilities in R&D networks	Alice Peng-Ju Su (National Taipei University) Information Revelation in the Property Right Theory of the Firms	Artyom Jelnov (Ariel University, Israel) Attacking the Unknown Weapons of a Possible Provocateur: How Intelligence Affects the Strategic Interaction	Ernest Lai (Lehigh University) Meaning and Credibility in Experimental Cheap-Talk Games
15:45 - 16:15	Zhe Wang (Stanford University) Initiation of Merger and Acquisition Negotiation with Two-Sided Private Information	Joyce Delnoij (Utrecht University) Competing first price and second price auctions			Venky Venkateswaran (NYU Stern School of Business) Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets	Jiabin Wu (University of Oregon) The Political Roots of Inequality and Inefficiency: An Evolutionary Model Under Political Institutions	Heinrich Harald Nax (ETH Zurich) Meritocracy Can Dissolve the Efficiency-Equality Tradeoff: the Case of Voluntary Contributions Games
16:15 - 16:45	Coffee Break						
16:45 - 17:30	Michael Kearns (University of Pennsylvania) Privacy, Game Theory, and Terrorism						

Tuesday, July 21

9:00
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9:45

Philip J. Reny (University of Chicago)
Sequential Equilibria of Multistage Games with Infinite Sets of Actions and Types

9:45
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10:15

Coffee Break

*LH1:
Applications*

*101:
Dynamic Games*

*102:
Information
and Networks*

*201:
Bargaining*

*301:
Signalling*

*LH2:
Learning and
Evolution*

*Chapel:
Cost Allocation*

10:15
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10:45

Jin Yeub Kim

(The University of Nebraska-Lincoln)
The Economics of the Right To Be Forgotten

Stefan Terstiege

(University of Bonn)
Gathering information before signing a contract: the case of imperfect information

Dominik Karos

(University of Oxford)
Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks

Chang Zhao

(Stony Brook University)
Bargaining Over Property Right Sale with Credible Threat

Sneha Gaddam

(University of Leicester)
Delegation of Authority in Non-contractible Cost Setting

Tao Wang

(Stony Brook University)
Information Acquisition, Signaling and Learning in Duopoly

Luis Ortiz

(Stony Brook University)
Graphical Potential Games

10:45
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11:15

Moshe Hoffman

(Harvard)
Cooperate without looking: Why we care what people think and not just what they do

Thomas Edward Wiseman

(University of Texas at Austin)
Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game

Christian Kellner

(Uni Bonn)
Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk

Fei Li

Cancelled

Tobias Gesche

(University of Zurich)
De-biasing strategic communication?

Zibo Xu

(Singapore University of Technology and Design)
Best-response Dynamics in Zero-sum Stochastic Games

Eric Bahel

(Virginia Tech)
Stable cost sharing in production allocation games

11:15
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11:45

Asha Sadanand
New

(University of Guelph)
Does Contamination affect Residential Property Values?

Michael James Neely

Cancelled

Yuke Li

(Yale University)
A Network Approach to International Relations

Younghwan In

(KAIST)
A new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution: fictitious play

Russell Golman

(Carnegie Mellon University)
Good Manners: Signaling Social Preferences

Dai Zusai

(Temple University)
Best response dynamic in a multitask environment

Sneha Bakshi

(University of Texas at Dallas)
Cost Enabled Choice of Pricing Rule when Buyers' Information is Private

11:45
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13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15	Jason Hartline (Northwestern University) The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions						
14:15-14:45	Coffee Break						
	<i>LH1: Solution Concepts</i>	<i>101: Auctions</i>	<i>102: Mechanism Design</i>	<i>201: Industrial Organization</i>	<i>301: Incomplete Information</i>	<i>LH2: Voting</i>	<i>Chapel: Cooperative Games</i>
14:45 - 15:15	Dov Samet (Tel Aviv University) The sure thing principle	Eiichiro Kazumori (SUNY at Buffalo) Building the Auction Markets for the World's Premier Risk-Free Securities: A Structural Analysis of the Primary Dealer System in the US Treasury Auctions.	Alia Gizatulina (University of St. Gallen) Betting on Others' Bets: Unions of Surplus Extraction Mechanisms	Johannes Meya (Goettingen University) Dynamics of Yardstick Regulation: Historical Cost Data and the Ratchet Effect	Yizhou Xiao (Stanford University) Information and Dynamic Trade	Yaron Azrieli (Ohio State University) On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules	Francesc Llerena (Rovira i Virgili University (Spain)) On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games
15:15 - 15:45	Mantas Radzvilas (London School of Economics and Political Science) Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests	Adi Vardi (Tel Aviv University) Truthful Secretaries with Budgets	Yu Chen (Nanjing University) On Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation	Ting Liu (Stony Brook University) Using clients' rejection to build trust	Till Florian Kauffeldt (University of Heidelberg (Germany)) Games with exogenous uncertainty played by “Knightian” players	Christian Basteck (Technical University of Berlin) The Borda Count and dominance solvable voting games	Tamas Solymosi (Corvinus University of Budapest) Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs in assignment games
15:45 - 16:15		Jun Xiao (University of Melbourne) Awarding Scarce Ideas in Innovation Contests	Endre Csóka (University of Warwick) Efficient Teamwork	Bruno Salcedo (Pennsylvania State University) Identification of solution concepts for semi-parametric discrete games with complete information		Peter Coughlin (University of Maryland) Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition	Yuan Tian (University of Chicago) Strategy-proof and Efficient Fair Scheduling
16:15-16:45	Coffee Break						
16:45 - 17:30	Kevin Leyton-Brown (University of British Columbia) TBA						

Wednesday, July 22

9:00
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9:45

Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University)
When Do Simple Mechanisms Suffice

9:45
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10:15

Coffee Break

*LH1:
Applications*

*101:
Bounded
Rationality*

*102:
Information and
Networks*

*201:
Matching*

*301:
Signalling*

*Theater:
Risk*

10:15
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10:45

Maxim Nikitin
(Higher School of Economics)
Financially-Constrained Lawyers

Anna Rubinchik
(University of Haifa)
Impulsive decisions: nature or nurture? A stochastic approximation approach

Alexander Matros
(University of South Carolina)
Contests on Networks

Nicholas Arnosti
(Stanford University)
Short Lists In Centralized Clearinghouses

Jonas Hedlund
(University of Heidelberg)
Bayesian signaling

Pulkit Kumar Nigam
(University of South Carolina)
Optimal Lottery for Fundraising: The Organizer's Problem

10:45
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11:15

Igor Letina
(University of Zurich)
Procuring Diversity

Mark Schneider
(University of Connecticut)
Frame Dependent Utility Theory

Norma Olaizola
(University of the Basque Country)
A unifying model of strategic network formation

Ata Atay
(University of Barcelona)
Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core and competitive prices

Daeyoung Jeong
(The Ohio State University)
Cheap Talk and Collective Decision-Making: Voting Rules and Informed Decision Makers

Tomer Siedner
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Risk of Monetary Gambles: An Axiomatic Approach

11:15
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11:45

Ryan Scott Penning
(Energid Technologies)
Game Theory-Inspired Evaluation of Ground Vehicle Autonomy

Daniel Wood
(Clemson University)
Vague Messages in Biased Information Transmission: Experiments and Theory

Sophie Bade
(Royal Holloway, University of London)
Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only.

Jeffrey Mensch
(Northwestern University)
Monotone Persuasion

Jose Francisco Tudon Maldonado
(University of Chicago)
Price dispersion with ex ante homogeneity: A reassessment of the Diamond paradox

11:45
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13:30

Lunch Break

13:30-14:15	Susan Athey (Stanford University) The Internet and the News Media					
14:15-14:45	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
	<i>LH1: Computation</i>	<i>101: Auctions</i>	<i>102: Mechanism Design</i>	<i>201: Knowledge and Expectations</i>	<i>301: Incomplete Information</i>	<i>Theater: Voting</i>
14:45 - 15:15	Hau Chan (Stony Brook University) Resource Allocation with Budgets: Optimal Stable Allocations and Optimal Lotteries	Tomasz Michalak (University of Oxford) Spiteful Bidding in the Dollar Auction	Alia Gizatulina (University of St. Gallen) The Genericity of the McAfee-Reny Condition for Full Surplus Extraction in Models with a Continuum of Types	Can Baskent (University of Bath, England) Non-Classical Approaches to the Brandenburger-Keisler Paradox	Yonggyun Kim (Korea Military Academy) Stochastic Dominance of Signals and Reparametrization in Adverse Selection Model	Frank Huettnner (HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management) Potential, voting, and power
15:15 - 15:45	Amy Greenwald (Brown University) Solving for Best-Responses and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games with Reinforcement Learning Methods	Mariann Ollar (Univeristy of Pennsylvania, Department of Economics) Privacy Preserving Market Design	Nima Haghpahan (MIT) Reverse Mechanism Design	Pedro Jara-Moroni (Universidad de Santiago de Chile) Rationalizability and Mixed Strategies in Large Games	Wolfgang Kuhle Observing Each Other's Observations in the Electronic Mail Game	Ritesh Jain (The Ohio State University) Fairness in Mechanism Design
15:45 - 16:15	Mohammad T. Irfan (Bowdoin College) Causal Inference in Game-Theoretic Settings with Applications to Microfinance Markets	Sergio Parreiras (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) Drop-out in Small and Large Contests	Holger Herbst (University of Bonn) Pricing Heterogeneous Goods under Ex Post Private Information	Evan Piermont (University of Pittsburgh) Rationalization and Robustness in Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information	Yiming Liu (University of Pittsburgh) Is Reputation Bad? Loyalty and Competence Trade-off	
16:15-16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
16:30-17:15	Sergiu Hart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Evidence Games: Right to Remain Silent, Left to Disclose					
	John Nash: Commemoration					
17:15-17:30	Pradeep Dubey (Stony Brook University)					
17:30-18:00	John Milnor (Stony Brook University)					
18:30-22:00	Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)					

Thursday, July 23

9:00
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9:45

Rachel Kranton (Duke University)
Games Played on Networks

9:45
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10:15

Coffee Break

*Theater:
Applications*

*101:
Auctions*

*102:
Information and
Networks*

*201:
Matching*

*301:
Contracts*

*LH1:
Experimental
Economics*

10:15
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10:45

Jorg Spenkuch
(Northwestern University)
Backward Induction in the Wild:
Evidence from the U.S. Senate

Nora Szech
(Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)
Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release

Alexandros Rigos
(University of Leicester)
A Beauty Contest with Flexible Information Acquisition

Garth Baughman
(University of Pennsylvania)
Deadlines and Matching

Najmeh Rezaei Khavas
(visiting graduate researcher at UCLA)
The optimal group size in microcredit contracts

Kathleen Ngangoue
(DIW Berlin)
Learning from unrealized versus realized prices

10:45
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11:15

Tsz Ning Wong
(Pennsylvania State University)
Free Riding and Duplication in R&D

Andrey Malenko
(MIT Sloan School of Management)
Auction Design with Advised Bidders

Federico Valenciano
(University of the Basque Country)
The impact of negotiable cost-paying on basic models of network formation

Patrick Harless
(University of Rochester)
The Importance of Learning in Market Design

Elliot Lipnowski
(NYU Stern)
Repeated Delegation

Tahereh Rezaei Khavas
(Utrecht University)
Cultural Differences in Prisoner's Dilemma Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis

11:15
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11:45

Cagil Tasdemir
(The Graduate Center of CUNY)
The Strategy of Campaigning

Biligbaatar Tumendemberel
(Hebrew University)
Generalized Third-price Auctions

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13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15	Ehud Kalai (Northwestern University) Stability Cycles in Big Games				
14:15 - 14:45	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
	<i>Theater: Applications</i>	<i>101: Voting</i>	<i>102: Mechanism Design</i>	<i>201: Knowledge and Expectations</i>	<i>301: Incomplete Information</i>
14:45 - 15:15	Aaron Bodoh-Creed (U. of California, Berkeley) Affirmative Action as a Large Contest	Hao Hong (The Pennsylvania State University) Authoritarian Election as an Incentive Scheme	Irina Kirysheva (Nazarbayev University) Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests with Sabotage	Ling Yang (University of Pittsburgh) When Monitoring Hurts: Endogenous Information Acquisition in a Game of Persuasion	Jean-Francois Mercier (McGill University) Rent-Seeking Group Contests with Private Information
15:15 - 15:45	Jörg Franke (TU Dortmund) Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests	José Manuel Zarzuelo (The Basque Country University) An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index	Justin Merrill Peterson (University of South Carolina) Blind Stealing Games	Evan Piermont Presenter Change (University of Pittsburgh) Learning the Krepsian State: Exploration through Consumption	Lars Peter Metzger (Dortmund University) Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information
15:45 - 16:15	Guy Arie (University of Rochester) Intermediary Bargaining for Price-Insensitive Consumers	Xin Zhao (University of Toronto) Information Acquisition in Heterogeneous Committees	Benjamin Schickner (University of Bonn) Dynamic Formation of Teams: When Does Waiting for Good Matches Pay Off?	Chih-Chun Yang (Academia Sinica) Strong belief and weak assumption	Miklos Pinter (Corvinus University of Budapest) A new epistemic model
16:15 - 16:45	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
16:45 - 17:30	Matthew Jackson (Stanford University) Repeated Favor Exchange and the Structure of Social Networks				

Friday, July 24

9:00 - 9:45	Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research New England) The impact of status concerns in social interactions					
9:45 - 10:15	Coffee Break					
	<i>LH1: Fairness</i>	<i>101: Auctions</i>	<i>102: Cooperative Games</i>	<i>201: Bargaining</i>	<i>301: Matching</i>	<i>LH2: Social and Political Models</i>
10:15 - 10:45	Steven Brams (New York University) How to Divide Things Fairly	Nicholas Arnosti (Stanford University) Auctions, Adverse Selection, and Internet Display Advertising	Josune Albizuri (Basque Country University) A common axiom for classical division rules for claims problems	Jack Anthony Fanning (Brown University) Polarization and delay: uncertainty in reputational bargaining	Britta Hoyer (University of Paderborn) Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents in a University Clearinghouse	Pere Timoner (Universitat de Barcelona) Rationing problems with ex-ante conditions
10:45 - 11:15	Wiroy Shin (The Pennsylvania State University) Discrimination in Organizations	Brian Baisa (Amherst College) A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders	Gabriela Delgadillo (National Polytechnic Institute (I.P.N.)) Computing the Strong Nash Equilibrium For Conforming Coalitions	Ilwoo Hwang (University of Miami) A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock	Francisco Robles (Universitat de Barcelona) One-seller assignment market with multi-unit demands	Jorge Alcalde-Unzu (Public University of Navarre, Spain.) Strategy-proof location of public facilities
11:15 - 11:45		XiaoGang Che (Durham University Business School, UK) Auctions versus Sequential Mechanism When Resale is Allowed	Josep M. Izquierdo (Universitat de Barcelona) The core and the bargaining set for convex games	Dongkyu Chang (Yale University) The Role of Commitment and Outside Options in Bargaining	Peter Troyan Cancelled	
11:45 - 13:30	Lunch Break					

13:30 - 14:15	Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) Communication Cooperation and Credibility in Repeated Games				
14:15 - 14:45	Coffee Break				
	<i>LH1:</i> <i>Solution Concepts</i>	<i>102:</i> <i>Mechanism Design</i>	<i>201:</i> <i>Learning and Evolution</i>	<i>301:</i> <i>Incomplete Information</i>	<i>LH2:</i> <i>Dynamic Games</i>
14:45 - 15:15	Yannai Aharon Gonczarowski (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Research) Cascading to Equilibrium: Hydraulic Computation of Equilibria in Resource Selection Games	Albert Xin Jiang (Trinity University) Resource Graph Games: A Compact Representation for Games with Structured Strategy Spaces	Holly Borowski (University of Colorado) Understanding the Influence of Adversaries in Distributed Systems	Thomas Joseph Rivera (HEC Paris) Regulation and the Structure of Information: The Effects of Peer Monitoring on Capital Adequacy Regulation	Ayca Kaya (University of Miami) Trading dynamics in the market for lemons
15:15 - 15:45	Yehuda Levy (University of Oxford) Projections and Functions of Nash Equilibria	Ran Shorrer (Harvard University) A Model of Mechanism Design in the Presence of a Pre-Existing Game	Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas, Austin) Strategic exit with random observations	Jiemai Wu (Washington University in St. Louis) Learning in Persuasion with Multiple Advisors	Yi Chen (Yale University) Strategic Experimentation On A Common Threshold
15:45 - 16:15	Anna Zseleva (Maastricht University) Zero-sum games with charges	Cedric Wasser (University of Bonn) Dissolving Partnerships Optimally	Liwen Chen (University of South Carolina) Equilibrium Selection of Public Good Provision Mechanisms	Peter Orman (UNC Chapel Hill) On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders	Daria Khromenkova (University of Mannheim) Collective Experimentation with Breakdowns and Breakthroughs