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Monday, July 8 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Geoffroy De Clippel
(Brown University)
On the Selection of Arbitrators
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Cooperative Games
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Session B: Bargaining
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Session C: Coalition Formation
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Session D: Cost Sharing
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Session E: Industrial Organization
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Session F: Learning/Evolution
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Ziv Hellman
(Tel Aviv University)
Spectral Value for Coalitional Games
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Alfi Jiménez
(Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas)
The Dark Side of Clientelism
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Dominik Karos
(Saarland University)
Power and Bargaining
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Omer Edhan
(The University of Manchester)
Cost Sharing with Production Constraints
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CANCELLED
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Georgy Loginov
(UW Madison )
Cyclical Behavior in Two-Speed Evolutionary Game Environments
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Chih-Ru Hsiao
(Soochow University)
A Geometric Interpretation of the Shapley value for TU Games
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Andrey Meshalkin
(Maastricht University)
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Majoritarian Bargaining
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Joosung Lee
(Penn State University)
Bargaining and Buyout
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Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan
(California Institute of Technology)
Potential games are necessary to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games
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Alex Barrachina
(University Carlos III de Madrid)
Entry with Two Correlated Signals
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Marius-Ionut Ochea
(University of Amsterdam)
Evolution of Reciprocity in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas
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11:15 - 11:45 |
Rosemarie Nagel
(UPF Barcelona, now visiting NYU)
The agencies method for coalition formation in experimental games
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Onur Cobanli
(Humboldt University Berlin)
Pipeline Power
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Karl Robert L. Jandoc
(University of Hawai'i)
Stable Coalitions with Power Accumulation
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Marc Schröder
(Maastricht University)
A non-cooperative analysis of the estate division problem
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Dávid Kopányi
(University of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute)
Price-Quantity Competition with Risk-averse Firms
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Jason Marden
(University of Colorado at Boulder)
Selecting Efficient Coarse Correlated Equilibria Through Distributed Learning
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11:45 - 12:00 |
Coffee Break
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12:00 - 12:45 |
Ehud Kalai
(Northwestern University)
Compressed Equilibrium in Large Repeated Games of Incomplete Information
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12:45 - 14:15 |
Lunch Break
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14:15 - 15:00 |
Robert John Aumann
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Collectives as Individuals
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15:00 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Cooperative Games
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Session B: Auctions
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Session C: Dynamic Games
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Session D: Experimental Economics
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Session E: Learning/Evolution
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Session F: Bargaining
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Elena Inarra
(University of the Basque Country)
The von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets for 2x2 games
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Eiichiro Kazumori
(SUNY at Buffalo)
Information Aggregation in Double Auction Markets with Interdependent Values
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Fei Li
(University of Pennsylvania)
Revenue Management without Commitment: Dynamic Pricing and Periodic Fire Sales
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Walter Yuan
(MobLab Inc)
Learning by Playing: Interactive games for game theory classroom
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Daniel Wood
(Clemson University)
Cognitive Biases in Stochastic Coordination Games and Their Evolution
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Cheng-Zhong Qin
(UC Santa Barbara)
A Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
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15:45 - 16:15 |
Tomasz Michalak
(University of Oxford)
The Marginality Approach for the Shapley Value in Games with Externalities
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XiaoGang Che
(University of Alberta, Canada)
Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions
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Saeed Mohammadian Moghayer
(University of Amsterdam, and TNO Delft)
Stock-dependent discrete-time dynamic pollution games
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Nora Szech
(University of Bonn)
Morals and Markets
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Todd Stambaugh
(CUNY Graduate Center)
Coincidence of Two Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
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16:15 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Sergiu Hart
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Two(!) Good To Be True
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Tuesday, July 9 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Olivier Gossner
(Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics)
The Appeal of Information Transactions
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Experimental Economics
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Session B: Finance
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Session C: Industrial Organization
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Session D: Information and Networks
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Session E: Matching
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Session F: Mechanism Design
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Daniel Cracau
(University of Magdeburg)
Firm behaviour in price-quantity oligopolies: An experimental study of the mixed strategy equilibrium
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CANCELLED
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Felipe Zurita
(Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile)
Competitive pressure and incentives in the quality game: The reputational mechanism
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CANCELLED
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Emiliya A Lazarova
(University of Birmingham)
Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
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Yu Chen
(Indiana University)
Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?
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10:45 - 11:15 |
J. Stephen Judd
(U. Penn CIS)
Conflict Begets Cooperation in Socialized KingPawn
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Maryam Sami
(Stony Brook University)
Financial Contagion and Reputational Concerns of Fund Managers in Diversified Funds
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Barna Bako
(MTA TKI)
Exclusive contracts with product differentiation in successive oligopolies
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Rupei Xu
(University of Minnesota--Twin Cities)
Altruism in Local and Global Network Topologies: A Game Theoretic Study of Resource Allocation in Social Networks
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Sofya Kiselgof
(NRU Higher School of Economics)
Matching with interval order preferences:stability and Pareto-efficiency
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Heng Liu
(University of Rochester)
Efficient mechanism design in interdependent-valuation environments
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11:15 - 11:45 |
Lu Dong
(University of Nottingham)
Trying to Overcome Coordination Failure in a Tough Environment
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Yan Liu
(Stony Brook University)
Bank Competition and Lending Policy over Business Cycles
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Robert Somogyi
(Ecole Polytechnique)
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with substantial product differentiation
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Amparo Urbano
(University of Valencia)
Local Coordination and Global Congestion in Random Networks
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Umut Dur
(University of Texas at Austin)
Sequential Assignment Problems and Two Applications
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Jung You
(Rice University)
Optimal VCG Mechanisms to Assign Multiple Bads
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11:45 - 12:00 |
Coffee Break
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12:00 - 12:45 |
Nicolas Vieille
(HEC Paris)
Stochastic games: a quick overview
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12:45 - 14:15 |
Lunch Break
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MERTENS AFTERNOON
(In memory of Jean-Francois Mertens)
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14:15 - 15:00 |
Francoise Forges
(Universite Paris Dauphine)
Bayesian repeated games
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15:00 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Refinements
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Session B: Incomplete Information
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Session C: Knowledge Expectations
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Session D: Stochastic games
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Session E: Learning and Evolution
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Matias Nunez
(CNRS-Cergy)
Hybrid Procedures
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Eran Shmaya
(Northwestern University)
Compressed equilibrium in large repeated games with incomplete information
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Alexander Funcke
(Stockholm University)
Making empathy obsolete: Enforcing equilibrium selection despite path-dependency
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Gijs Schoenmakers
(Maastricht University)
Algorithms for finding subgame perfect equilibria in recursive games with perfect information
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Steven Perkins
(University of Bristol)
Stochastic Fictitious Play with Continuous Action Sets
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15:45 - 16:15 |
Asha Sadanand
(University of Guelph)
Signalling Games with Multiple Senders
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Gregory Pavlov
(University of Western Ontario)
Correlated equilibria in zero-sum games with incomplete information
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Peio Zuazo-Garin
(University of the Basque Country)
Incomplete Imperfect Information and Backward Induction
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János Flesch
(Maastricht University)
Refinements of subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in games with perfect information
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Zibo Xu
(Stockholm School of Economics)
Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games
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16:15 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Sylvain Sorin
(Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6)
On Reversibility and Oscillations in Zero-sum Discounted Stochastic Games
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18:00 - 22:00 |
Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)
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Wednesday, July 10 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Tristan Tomala
(HEC Paris)
Approximate Implementation In Markovian Environments
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Bargaining
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Session B: Mechanism Design
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Session C: Solution Concepts
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Session D: Voting
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Session E: Auctions
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Session F: Applications
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Jin Yeub Kim
(The University of Chicago)
Endogenous Choice of a Mediator
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William Phan
(University of Rochester)
Economies with Replicable Objects
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Bruno Salcedo
(PennState)
Implementation without commitment in moral hazard environments
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Javier Rivas
(University of Leicester)
Deliberation, Leadership and Information Aggregation
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Songzi Du
(Simon Fraser University)
Ex Post Equilibria in Double Auctions of Divisible Assets
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Timothy Mathews
(Kennesaw State University)
A Sequential Choice Model of Family Business Succession
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Paolo Turrini
(Imperial College London)
Non-cooperative games with preplay negotiations
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Philip N. Brown
(The University of Colorado at Boulder)
Social Coordination in Unknown Price-Sensitive Populations
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CANCELLED
|
Yaron Azrieli
(The Ohio State University)
The optimal sovereignty partition
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Brian Baisa
(Yale)
Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences
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Georgy Lukyanov
(Toulouse School of Economics)
Coordination Frictions and Public Communication
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|
11:15 - 11:45 |
|
Guy Arie
(University of Rochester)
Dynamic Costs and Moral Hazard: A Duality Based Approach
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Marilda Sotomayor
(Universidade de Săo Paulo)
Modeling Cooperative Decision Situations: The Deviation Function Form and The Equilibrium Concept
|
SunTak Kim
(National Taiwan University)
Information Acquisition and Voting Mechanisms
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Alexander Matros
(University of South Carolina)
Common Value Mechanisms with Private Information
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Timothy Lambie-Hanson
(Suffolk University)
Shared Risk in n-player Games
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11:45 - 12:00 |
Coffee Break
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12:00 - 12:45 |
Philip J. Reny
(University of Chicago)
Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions
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12:45 - 14:15 |
Lunch Break
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14:15 - 15:00 |
Al Roth
(Stanford University)
Kidney Exchange: Where We've Been and Where We May Be Headed
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15:00 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Bounded Rationality
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Session B: Contracts
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Session C: Dynamic Games
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Session D: Experimental Economics
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Session E: Learning and Evolution
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Session F: Computation
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Adrian Marple
(Stanford University)
Equilibria in Finite Games with Imperfect Recall
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Renato Gomes
(Toulouse School of Economics)
Experimentation and Project Selection: Screening and Learning
|
Yingni Guo
(Yale University)
Optimal Delegation Contract with Experimentation
|
Frederic Moisan
(University of Toulouse)
The Behavioral Effects of Social Ties: an Experimental Study
|
Yi Zhang
(Singapore Management University)
Robust Information Cascade with Endogenous Ordering
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Marek Jerzy Szopa
(University of Silesia)
Nash Equilibria of the Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma
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|
15:45 - 16:15 |
Kota Murayama
(Hitotsubashi University)
Robust Predictions under Finite Depth of Reasoning
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Evangelia Chalioti
(University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Team members' ability matters for career concerns
|
Marco Scarsini
(SUTD)
Dynamic Congestion Games: The Price of Seasonality
|
Yun Wang
(University of Pittsburgh)
An Experimental Investigation on Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games
|
Ed Hopkins
(Edinburgh University)
Inequality and Risk Taking Behavior
|
Yuke Li
(Yale University)
A Computational Model of Conflict and Cooperation
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|
16:15 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 19:45 |
Roundtable Discussion: The Present and Future of Game Theory
(Program)
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Thursday, July 11 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Eilon Solan
(Tel Aviv University)
Stopping games
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Experimental Economics
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Session B: Mechanism Design
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Session C: Voting
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Session D: Auctions
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Session E: Applications
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|
10:15 - 10:45 |
Melayne McInnes
(University of South Carolina)
Lake Wobegon: Experimental Tests of Learning and the “Better than Average Effect”
|
Andreas Reischmann
(AWI, Heidelberg University)
A conditional contribution mechanism for the provision of public goods
|
Boris Ginzburg
(University College London)
Collective Preference for Ignorance
|
Frank Rosar
(University of Bonn)
Optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries
|
Guocheng Wang
(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
Game Modeling and Strategic Behavior Analysis of Stakeholders in Public Goods Provision
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|
10:45 - 11:15 |
Ernest Lai
(Lehigh University)
Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response
|
Ryan Tierney
(University of Rochester)
Strategy-proofness and Asymptotic Efficiency in Exchange Economies
|
Ling Yang
(University of Pittsburgh)
Partisan Voting and Uncertainty
|
Ram Orzach
(Oakland University)
Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information
|
Bernhard Ganglmair
(University of Texas at Dallas)
Framing Games: Evidence-Based Decision Making in an Adversarial Setting
|
|
11:15 - 11:45 |
Heinrich Harald Nax
(PSE, Ecole Normale Superieure)
Learning in a Black Box
|
Abhinav Anand
(Stony Brook University)
Quotas versus Handicaps: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Armative Action Policies in India
|
Zhengjia Jiang
The Lobbying Game with Asymmetric Information
|
Sergio Parreiras
(The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
A Tortoise And A Hare Race, Part I: Finite Horizon
|
Steven Brams
(New York University)
Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes
|
|
11:45 - 12:00 |
Coffee Break
|
|
12:00 - 12:45 |
Amrita Dhillon
(University of Warwick)
Status incentives and corruption
|
|
12:45 - 14:15 |
Lunch Break
|
|
|
MERTENS AFTERNOON
(In memory of Jean-Francois Mertens)
|
|
14:15 - 15:00 |
Abraham Neyman
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Robust equilibria of continuous-time stochastic games
|
|
15:00 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
|
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|
Session A: Solution Concepts
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Session B: Incomplete Information
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Session C: Knowledge and Expectations
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Session D: Learning and Evolution
|
Session E: Repeated Games
|
|
15:15 - 15:45 |
Joseph M. Abdou
(Paris 1 and PSE)
The structure of board games
|
Andrei Barbos
(University of South Florida)
Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation
|
Nuh Aygun Dalkiran
(Bilkent University)
Common Knowledge and State-dependent Equilibria
|
Yehuda Levy
(Hebrew University)
Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring
|
Yu Awaya
(Penn State University)
Communication in a Dynamic Prisoner's Dilemma with Incomplete Information
|
|
15:45 - 16:15 |
Vladyslav Nora
(Université catholique de Louvain, CORE)
Saddle Functions and Robust Sets of Equilibria
|
Shih En Lu
(Simon Fraser University)
Almost Fully Revealing Cheap Talk with Imperfectly Informed Senders
|
Ben Wang
(National University of Singapore)
An Epistemic Characterization of RSCE
|
Seung Han Yoo
(Korea University)
Learning a Population Distribution
|
Ting Liu
(Stony Brook University)
Reputation building in credence good markets
|
|
16:15 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
|
|
16:30 - 17:15 |
Shmuel Zamir
(The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Representations of constitutions under incomplete information
|
|
|
Friday, July 12 |
|
9:00 - 9:45 |
Drew Fudenberg
(Harvard University)
Recursive Stochastic Choice
|
|
9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
|
|
|
Session A: Mechanism Design
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Session B: Mechanism Design
|
Session C: Social and Political Models
|
Session D: Fairness
|
Session E: Signalling
|
|
10:15 - 10:45 |
Greg Plaxton
(University of Texas at Austin)
A Simple Family of Top Trading Cycles Mechanisms for Housing Markets with Indifferences
|
Daniel Ferguson Garrett
(Toulouse School of Economics)
Competitive Screening and Search
|
Bernhard Von Stengel
(London School of Economics)
Game Theory Explorer - Software for the Applied Game Theorist
|
Lorini Emiliano
(IRIT-CNRS)
When the Group Matters: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Team Reasoning and Social Ties
|
Bernhard Ganglmair
(University of Texas at Dallas)
Conversation with Secrets
|
|
10:45 - 11:15 |
Christoph Mueller
(Carnegie Mellon University)
Robust Implementation in Weakly Rationalizable Strategies
|
Sina Litterscheid
(University of Bonn)
Sequential, multidimensional Screening
|
Yi Zhang
(Singapore Management University)
Anonymous Matching and Group Reputation
|
Stefania Minardi
(HEC Paris)
Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish
|
Sander Heinsalu
(Yale)
Continuous time noisy signalling
|
|
11:15 - 11:45 |
Rahul Deb
(University of Toronto)
Implementation with Securities
|
Brandon Jonathan Campbell
(Texas A&M University)
Theory on the Design of Experiments.
|
Ethem Akyol
(The Pennsylvania State University)
Welfare Comparison of School Choice Mechanisms under Incomplete Information
|
Alan Daniel Miller
(University of Haifa)
A Behavioral Arrow Theorem
|
Maria Goltsman
(University of Western Ontario)
On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
|
|
11:45 - 12:00 |
Coffee Break
|
|
12:00 - 12:45 |
Johannes Horner
(Yale University)
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
|
|
12:45 - 14:15 |
Lunch Break
|
|
14:15 - 15:00 |
Rida Laraki
(CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique)
Higher Order Game Dynamics
|
|
15:00 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
|
|
|
Session A: Contracts
|
Session B: Repeated Games
|
Session C: Matching
|
Session D: Auctions
|
Session E: Bounded Rationality
|
Session F: Signalling
|
|
15:15 - 15:45 |
Martin Pollrich
(Humboldt University Berlin)
On the benefits of mediation in contracting problems with limited commitment
|
Tadashi Sekiguchi
(Kyoto University)
Multimarket Contact under Demand Fluctuations: A Limit Result
|
Ahmad Peivandi Karizbodaghi
(Northwestern University)
Random allocation of bundles
|
Hanzhe Zhang
(University of Chicago)
Reserve Price Auctions in a Dynamic Heterogeneous Goods Market
|
Tatiana Kornienko
(University of Edinburgh)
A Cognitive Basis for Adaptive Utility
|
Farishta Satari
(CUNY Graduate Center)
Cheap Talk in the Presence of an Audience
|
|
15:45 - 16:15 |
Noam Tanner
(Yale University)
Optimal Delegation Under Uncertain Bias
|
Juan Ignacio Block
(Washington University in St. Louis)
Codes of Conduct and Bad Reputation
|
Peter Troyan
(Stanford University)
Implementing Diversity in School Choice
|
Elon Kohlberg
(Harvard University)
Shapley Value of Stochastic Games
|
Zsombor Zoltan Meder
(Maastricht University)
Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
|
Jae Kang
(University of Pittsburgh)
Multiple Experts Informing a Constrained Decision-maker
|
|
16:15 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
|
|
16:30 - 17:15 |
Larry Samuelson
(Yale University)
Investment and Matching
|
|