International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 15 - 19, 2012

Schedule of Talks

Sunday, July 15					
9:00 - 9:45	**Asu Ozdaglar** (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Dynamics in Near-Potential Games				
9:45 - 10:15	*Coffee Break*				
	Session A: *Mechanism Design*	Session B: *Matching*	Session C: *Knowledge*	Session D: *Networks*	Session E: *Reputation*	Session F: *Computation*
10:15 - 10:45	**Nick Bedard** (University of Western Ontario) The Strategically Ignorant Principal	**Umut Dur** (University of Texas at Austin) Tuition Exchange	**Adam Dominiak** (Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University) "Agreeing to Disagree" Type Results under Ambiguity	**Penelope Hernandez** (University of Valencia) Strategic sharing of a costly network	**Zehao Hu** (University of Pennsylvania) Vanishing Beliefs But Persisting Reputation	**Dieter Balkenborg** (University of Exeter) Polyhedra and Nash equilibrium components: An elementary construction.
10:45 - 11:15	**Jing Chen** (MIT) Epistemic Implementation and The Arbitrary-Belief Auction	**Alexander Teytelboym** (University of Oxford) Strong stability in contractual networks and matching markets	**Ziv Hellman** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Deludedly Agreeing to Agree	**Guillem Martinez** (University of Valencia) Small world networks games	**Thomas Norman** (Oxford) Almost-Rational Learning of Nash Equilibrium without Absolute Continuity	**Pawel Dziewuski** (University of Oxford) Equilibria in large games with strategic complementaries
11:15 - 11:45	**Ville Korpela** (University of Turku) Bayesian Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals	**Takeshi Suzuki** (Brown University) Assignment Games with Path-Dependent Preferences	**Bassel Tarbush** (University of Oxford) Agreeing to disagree: a syntactic approach	**Manuel Munoz-Herrera** (Rijksuniversit eit Groningen) Productive Exchange Games in Networks	**Francesc Dilme** (University of Pennsylvania) Reputations through Switching Costs	**Vianney Perchet** (U. Paris 7) Nash Equilibria with uncertainties; Generalization of Lemke Howson algorithm

11:45 - 12:00	*Coffee Break*				
12:00 - 12:45	**Srihari Govindan** (University of Rochester) Competition for a Majority				
12:45 - 14:15	*Lunch Break*				
14:15 - 15:00	**Adam (Tauman) Kalai** (Microsoft Research) Dueling Algorithms				
15:00 - 15:15	*Coffee Break*				
	Session A: *Voting*	Session B: *Solution Concepts*	Session C: *Incomplete Information*	Session D: *Contracts*	Session E: *Auctions*
15:15 - 15:45	**Peter Coughlin** (University of Maryland) Probabilistic Voting Models	**Tai-Wei Hu** (Northwestern University) Critical Comparisons between the Nash Noncooperative Theory and Rationalizability	**Fabien Gensbittel** (Toulouse School of Economics) Repeated Games with Incremental Information on One Side.	**Yutaka Suzuki** (Hosei University) Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework	**Eiichiro Kazumori** (SUNY at Buffalo) Information Aggregation in Large Double Auctions with Interdependent Values
15:45 - 16:15	**Yingni Guo** (Yale University) Information Sharing and Voting	**Michael Trost** (Max Planck Institute of Economics) An Epistemic Rationale for Order-Independence	**Xavier Venel** (University Toulouse 1 Capitole) Stochastic games with a more informed controller.	**Martin Szydlowski** (Northwestern) Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking	**Ina Taneva** (University of Texas at Austin) Disclosure of Private Information in Auctions with Two-Dimensional Types
16:15 - 16:45	*Coffee Break*				
16:45 - 17:30	**Jerome Renault** (University Toulouse 1) Limit values for Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a distance for belief spaces				

Monday, July 16

9:00 - 9:45	**Abraham Neyman** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Stochastic games with short-stage duration					
9:45 - 10:15	***Coffee Break***					
	Session A: *Experimental*	Session B: *Repeated Games*	Session C: *Cooperative Games*	Session D: *IO*	Session E: *Theory*	Session F: *Applications*
10:15 - 10:45	**Alexander Matros** (Lancaster University) All-Pay Auctions vs. Lotteries as Provisional Fixed-Prize Fundraising Mechanisms: Theory and Evidence	**Bo Chen** (Southern Methodist University) A Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Unequal Discounting	**Usha Sridhar** (Ecometrix Research) Pareto Optimal Allocation in Coalitional Games with Exponential Payoffs	**Pierre Fleckinger** (Paris School of Economics) Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments	**Nicolas (Alexandre) Klein** (University of Bonn) Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games	**Raphael Boleslavsky** (University of Miami, School of Business) Grade Inflation and Education Quality
10:45 - 11:15	**Leandro Chaves Rego** (Federal University of Pernambuco) Mixed Equilibrium, Collaborative Dominance and Burning Money: an experimental study	**Jonathan Lhost** (University of Texas at Austin) Worth the Wait? Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Search	**Giorgos Stamatopoulos** (University of Crete) Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms	**Bruno Oliveira** (Universidade do Porto) Strategic optimization in R&D Investment	**Utku Ozan Candogan** (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games	**Shah Mahmood** (University College Londdon) Two New Economic Models for Privacy
11:15 - 11:45	**Kim Kaivanto** (Lancaster U.) Community Level Natural Resource Management Institutions Work in (Game) Theory as Well as in Practice: Lottery Allocation of Fishing Sites Implements Correlated Equilibrium	**Marie Laclau** (HEC Paris) Communication in Repeated Network Games with Private Monitoring	**Andreas Nohn** (Public Choice Research Centre, Turku, Finland) Monotonicity of Power in Games with Restricted Communication		**Ryoji Sawa** (University of Wisconsin-Madison) An Analysis of Stochastic Stability in Bargaining Games with Behavioral Agents	**Ce Huang** (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China) Directed Search for Differentiated Goods

11:45 - 12:00	*Coffee Break*					
12:00 - 12:45	**Sylvain Chassang** (Princeton University) Dynamic allocation under limited liability					
12:45 - 14:15	*Lunch Break*					
14:15 - 15:00	**Pierre Cardaliaguet** (Université de Paris Dauphine) On Long Time Average of Mean Field Games					
15:00 - 15:15	*Coffee Break*					
	Session A: *Solution Concepts*	Session B: *Knowledge*	Session C: *Networks*	Session D: *Auctions*	Session E: *Political Economy*	Session F: *Applications*
15:15 - 15:45	**Zsombor Zoltan Meder** (Maastricht University) Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons	**Romeo Balanquit** (University of the Philippines) Common Belief Revisited	**Amrita Dhillon** (University of Warwick) Employee referral, social proximity and worker discipline	**Hanzhe Zhang** (University of Chicago) Optimal Auction Design Under Competition	**Yun Wang** (University of Pittsburgh) Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers	**Christina Pawlowitsch** (Paris School of Economics) Meaning, free will, and the certification of types in a Biblical game
15:45 - 16:15	**Peter Streufert** (University of Western Ontario) Specifying nodes as sets of actions	**Matthias Lang** (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) The Fog of Fraud - Mitigating Fraud by Strategic Ambiguity	**Juan Escobar** (University of Chile) Self Governance in Social Networks of Information Transmission		**Tânia Oliveira** (University of Porto) Dynamics of Human Decisions	**Jiawen Li** (University of York) A non-cooperative approach to the Talmud solution for bankruptcy problems
16:15 - 16:45	*Coffee Break*					
16:45 - 17:30	**Ludovic Renou** (University of Leicester) Repeated Nash Implementation					

Tuesday, July 17

	Session A: Stochastic Games	Session B: Signaling	Session C: Mechanism Design	Session D: Matching	Session E: Learning/Evolution	Session F: Fairness
9:00 - 9:45	**Eric Maskin** (Harvard University) — Evolution and Repeated Games					
9:45 - 10:15	*Coffee Break*					
10:15 - 10:45	**János Flesch** (Maastricht University) Subgame-perfection in free transition games	**Aaron Bodoh-Creed** (Cornell University) Conversations, Privacy, and Taboos	**Alejandro Francetich** (Stanford GSB) Endogenous Informational Asymmetries in Dynamic Mechanisms	**Wonki Jo Cho** (University of Rochester) Probabilistic Assignment: A Two-fold Axiomatic Approach	**Axel Bernergård** (Stockholm School of Economics) Finite-Population Mass-Action and Evolutionary Stability	**Yaron Azrieli** (The Ohio State University) A general existence result for envy-free assignments
10:45 - 11:15	**Yehuda Levy** (Hebrew University) A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium	**Fei Li** (University of Pennsylvania) Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout	**Ilan Lobel** (NYU) Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Sales and Inventory Information	**Peter Troyan** (Stanford University) Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas	**Jun Honda** (U. of Vienna) Equilibrium selection for symmetric coordination games with an application to the minimum-effort game	**Steven Brams** (New York University) N-Person Cake-Cutting: There May Be No Perfect Division
11:15 - 11:45	**Guillaume Vigeral** (Université Paris-Dauphine) A zero-sum stochastic game with compact action sets and no asymptotic value	**Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer** (European University Institute) A Model of Competitive Signaling	**Gwenaël Piaser** (IPAG Business School, Paris) Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games	**John Nash** (Princeton University) Plans and Work for Further Studies of Cooperative Games Using the 'Method of Acceptances'	**Panayotis Mertikopoulos** (CNRS) Higher Order Learning and Evolution in Games	**Karol Szwagrzak** (University of Rochester) Efficient, fair, and group strategy-proof (re)allocation in networks
11:45 - 12:00	*Coffee Break*					
12:00 - 12:45	**Robert Kohn** (New York University) — Parabolic PDEs and Deterministic Games					
12:45 - 14:15	*Lunch Break*					
14:15 - 18:00	**Celebration of Michel Balinski's 78 years**					
18:30 - 22:00	**Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)**					

Wednesday, July 18

9:00 - 15:00	Celebration of Michel Balinski's 78 years					
15:00 - 15:15	Coffee Break					
	Session A: *Repeated Games*	Session B: *Voting*	Session C: *Networks*	Session D: *Incomplete Information*	Session E: *Auctions*	Session F: *Political Economy*
15:15 - 15:45	**Juan Ignacio Block** (Washington University in St. Louis) Codes of Conduct, Private Information, and Repeated Games	**Zhengjia Jiang** A Complete Geometric Representation of Four-Player Weighted Voting Systems	**Norma Olaizola** (University of the Basque Country) One-way flow network formation under constraints	**Jeanne Hagenbach** (CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, France) Certifiable Pre-Play Communication	**Yumiko Baba** (Aoyamagakuin University) Four Unit-Price Auction Procedures	**Cheng Li** (University of Miami) Profiling, Screening and Criminal Recruitment
15:45 - 16:15	**Johannes Horner** (Yale University) How fast do equilibrium payoffs converge in repeated games?	**Alessandra Casella** (Columbia University) Vote trading with and without party leaders	**Federico Valenciano** (University of the Basque Country) Asymmetric flow networks	**Elena Inarra** (University of the Basque Country) On Payoff Irrelevant Beliefs and Discrimination	**Brian Baisa** (Yale) Rank Dependent Preferences and Auctions	**Uri Weiss** (The Center for The Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University) The International Criminal Court May Encourage Occupation
16:15 - 16:45	Coffee Break					
16:45 - 17:30	**Jose Rafael Correa** (Universidad de Chile) Preannounced Pricing Policies with Strategic Consumers					

Thursday, July 19

9:00 - 9:45	**William Sudderth** (University of Minnesota) Perfect Information Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs					
9:45 - 10:15	*Coffee Break*					
	Session A: *Stochastic Games*	Session B: *Learning and Evolution*	Session C: *Networks*	Session D: *Bargaining*	Session E: *Auctions and Discontinuous Games*	Session F: *Theory*
10:15 - 10:45	**Kimmo Berg** (Aalto University School of Science) Characterization of Equilibrium Paths in Discounted Stochastic Games	**Heinrich Harald Nax** (JHU) The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets	**Emerson Melo** (California Institute of Technology) Price competition, free entry, and welfare in congested markets	**Ilwoo Hwang** (University of Pennsylvania) Bargaining with Investment on the Outside Option	**Rupei Xu** (University of Minnesota--Twin Cities) Strategyproof Cost Sharing Auction Game Mechanism for Public Service Facilities	**Jie Zheng** (Tsinghua University) The Robustness of Bubbles in a Finite Horizon Model of Incomplete Information
10:45 - 11:15	**Svetlana Boyarchenko** (University of Texas, Austin) Preemption games under Levy uncertainty	**Daniel Wood** (Clemson University) Stable Conventions in Hawk-Dove Games with Many Players	**Brian Rogers** (Northwestern) Cooperation in Anonymous Dynamic Social Networks	**Leyla Derin Karakas** (Johns Hopkins University) Bargaining Under Institutional Challenges	**Sofia Moroni** (Yale University) Online Auctions with a Deadline	**Michael Richter** (New York University) Choice Theory via Equivalence
11:15 - 11:45	**Sergei Levendorskii** (University of Leicester) Stopping time games under Knightian uncertainty		**Evan D Sadler** (NYU Stern School of Business) Social Learning with Network Uncertainty	**Martina Nikolaeva Gogova** (EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und Recht) Incentive Contracts and Institutional Labor Market Design	**Rida Laraki** (CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique) A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Existence in Discontinuous Strategic Games	**Alberto Pinto** (University of Porto) On the convergence to Walrasian prices in random matching Edgeworthian economies

11:45 - 12:00	*Coffee Break*		
12:00 - 12:45	**Karl Schlag** (University of Vienna) Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments		
12:45 - 14:15	*Lunch Break*		
14:15 - 15:00	**Marco Scarsini** (LUISS) Existence of equilibria in countable games: an algebraic approach		
15:00 - 15:15	*Coffee Break*		

	Session A: *Repeated Games*	Session B: *Finance*	Session C: *Cooperative Games*	Session D: *Voting*
15:15 - 15:45	**Asaf Plan** (University of Arizona) Returns to scale in the generation map of repeated games	**Maryam Sami** (Stony Brook University) Reputational Concerns and Financial Contagion	**José Manuel Zarzuelo** (The Basque Country University) Extending the Nash Solution to Choice Problems with Reference Points	**Semin Kim** (The Ohio State University) Ordinal versus Cardinal Voting Rules: A Mechanism Design Approach
15:45 - 16:15		**Priyanka Sharma** (Texas A&M University) Is more information always better?: A case in credit markets	**Josune Albizuri** (Basque Country University) Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete version	**Jean Guillaume Forand** (University of Waterloo) Useless Prevention vs. Costly Remediation

16:15 - 16:45	*Coffee Break*		
16:45 - 17:30	**Bernard DeMeyer** (Université de Paris 1) Risk aversion and price dynamics on the stock market		