

Workshop on Game Theory in Trade and Development

Stony Brook, NY, July 19-20, 2011

Schedule of Talks

Tuesday, July 19	
9:30 - 10:30	Kyle Bagwell (Stanford University) International negotiations on international trade and related issues
10:30 - 11:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>
11:00 - 12:00	Roger Myerson (University of Chicago) The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State
12:00 - 13:15	<i>Lunch Break</i>
13:15 - 13:55	Renee Bowen (Stanford University) Limits of the WTO as a self-enforcing institution
13:55 - 14:35	James Lake (Johns Hopkins University) Preferential trade agreements as building or stumbling blocs? The importance of commitment
14:35 - 15:15	Mostafa Beshkar (University of New Hampshire) Third-Party-Assisted Renegotiation of Trade Agreements
15:15 - 15:40	<i>Coffee Break</i>
15:40 - 16:20	Kamal Saggi (Vanderbilt University) Equilibrium parallel import policies and international market structure
16:20 - 17:00	Rahul Deb (University of Toronto) Relational Contract Farming: Theory and Case Evidence
18:00 - 21:30	Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

Wednesday, July 20

9:30 - 10:30	<p>Avinash Dixit (Princeton University) Trade and investment in LDCs and transition economies with poor governance</p>
10:30 - 11:00	<p><i>Coffee Break</i></p>
11:00 - 12:00	<p>Timothy Besley (London School of Economics) Accountability and Incentives in Public Service Provision in Poor Countries</p>
12:00 - 13:15	<p><i>Lunch Break</i></p>
13:15 - 13:55	<p>Raja Kali (University of Arkansas) Political Connections, Entrepreneurship, and Social Network Investment</p>
13:55 - 14:35	<p>Juan Escobar (University of Chile) Self Governance in Networked Relationships</p>
14:35 - 15:15	<p>Farzad Saidi (New York University) Networks, Finance, and Development: Evidence from Hunter-Gatherers</p>
15:15 - 15:40	<p><i>Coffee Break</i></p>
15:40 - 16:20	<p>Haldun Evrenk (Suffolk University) Party-bosses vs. party-primaries: quality of legislature under different selectorates</p>
16:20 - 17:00	<p>Toan Phan (Northwestern University) Asymmetric Information and The Sustainability of Sovereign Debt</p>