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Monday, July 18 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Elon Kohlberg
(Harvard University)
The Nash-Shapley Solution of Strategic Games and Stochastic Games
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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LH1:Experimental Economics
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101:Dynamic Games
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102:Mechanism Design
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201:Auctions
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301:Incomplete Information
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LH2:Solution Concepts
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Penelope Hernandez
(ERI-CES University of Valencia)
Can Expertise Close the Experience-Description Gap?
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Aditya V Kuvalekar
(New York University)
Job Insecurity
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Mikhail Safronov
(University of Cambridge)
Efficient Coalition-Proof Full Implementation
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Ming Li
(Concordia University)
Benefits of conflict in delegation
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Peter Wikman
(Toulouse School of Economics)
Tenable Strategy Blocks and Evolutionary Stability
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Evan Friedman
(Columbia University)
Rational QRE: Endogenizing the Noise Parameter
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Svetlana Boyarchenko
(University of Texas, Austin)
Exit game with information externalities
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Ville Korpela
(University of Turku)
Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry
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Gagan Pratap Ghosh
(California State University Fullerton)
Sequential Second Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
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Wolfgang Kuhle
(Max Planck Institute, Bonn)
Thinking Ourselves into Recession
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Todd Stambaugh
(CUNY Graduate Center)
Rationalizability in Epistemic Games with Asynchronous Messages
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11:15 - 11:45 |
Howard Rachlin
(Stony Brook U.)
Social discounting and the prisoner's dilemma game
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Daria Khromenkova
(University of Mannheim)
Restless Strategic Experimentation
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Yunan Li
(University of Pennsylvania)
Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification
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Guillem Martinez-Canovas
(University of Valencia)
Incentives in Crowdsourcing: Cooperation and Success
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Jon Eguia
(Michigan State University)
m-Proper Equilibria
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11:45 - 13:30 |
Lunch Break
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13:30 - 14:15 |
Abraham Neyman
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Additive valuations of infinite streams of payoffs that satisfy the time-value of money principle: Characterization, robust optimization, and properties.
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14:15 - 14:45 |
Coffee Break
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LH1:Cooperative Games
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101:Repeated Games
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102:Bounded Rationality
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201:Signalling
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LH2:Conflict-Security
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14:45 - 15:15 |
Reinoud Joosten
(University of Twente)
More on linear-potential values and extending the `Shapley family' for TU-games
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Ghislain Herman Demeze Jouatsa
(University of Bielefeld)
On Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games
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Andy Luchuan Liu
(South University of Science & Technology)
Structures of Freedom and Rationality:On Theory of Choice
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Filippo Pavesi
(University of Verona & Stevens Institute of Technology)
Good Lies
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Roman Sheremeta
(Case Western Reserve University)
The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Ilya Katsev
(National Research University Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation)
The SD-prenucleolus and the SD-prekernel
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Vijay Kamble
(Stanford )
Regret-optimal Strategies for Playing Discounted Repeated Games
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Jun Zhang
(California Institute of Technology)
Stochastic Choice with Subjective Categorization
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Daehong Min
(University of Arizona)
Bayesian Persuasion under Partial Commitment
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Liuchun Deng
(Johns Hopkins University)
Criminal network formation and optimal detection policy: the role of cascade of detection
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15:45 - 16:15 |
Coffee Break
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16:15 - 17:00 |
Pradeep Dubey
(Stony Brook University)
Money as Minimal Complexity (In Honor of Lloyd Shapley)
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17:00 - 17:45 |
Sergiu Hart
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamics
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